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Abstract 
This report presents analytical and simulation results of an 
investigation into proposed operational concepts for closely 
spaced parallel runways, including the Simplified Aircraft-based 
Paired Approach (SAPA) with alerting and an escape maneuver, 
MITRE’s echelon spacing and no escape maneuver, and a hybrid 
concept aimed at lowering the visibility minima.  We found that 
the SAPA procedure can be used at 950 ft separations or higher 
with next-generation avionics and that 1150 ft separations or 
higher is feasible with current-rule compliant ADS-B OUT.  An 
additional 50 ft reduction in runway separation for the SAPA 
procedure is possible if different glideslopes are used.  For the 
echelon concept we determined that current generation aircraft 
cannot conduct paired approaches on parallel paths using 
echelon spacing on runways less than 1400 ft apart and next-
generation aircraft will not be able to conduct paired approach 
on runways less than 1050 ft apart.  The hybrid concept added 
alerting and an escape maneuver starting 1 NM from the 
threshold when flying the echelon concept.  This combination 
was found to be effective, but the probability of a collision can 
be seriously impacted if the turn component of the escape 
maneuver has to be disengaged near the ground (e.g. 300 ft or 
below) due to airport buildings and surrounding terrain.  We 
also found that stabilizing the approach path in the straight-in 
segment was only possible if the merge point was at least 1.5 to 2 
NM from the threshold unless the total system error can be 
sufficiently constrained on the offset path and final turn. 
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1. Introduction 
In our previous work, we developed an alerting algorithm and Java/C++ software 
implementations called ALAS [Perry2013].  ALAS (Adjacent Landing Alerting System) is an 
alerting algorithm designed to detect intrusions on closely spaced parallel runways.  It employs a 
mechanism for detecting imminent collisions with the adjacent traffic aircraft and a mechanism 
for detecting lateral deviations from the runway centerline in a manner similar to the Precision 
Runway Monitor system [Shank1994].  The algorithm is highly configurable through a set of 
user-specifiable parameters.  We also developed a fast-time simulation called tAlas, which was 
able to simulate about 20,000 parallel approaches per minute.  The tAlas simulation was used to 
evaluate the ALAS algorithm in the context of a parallel runway separated by 750 ft.  The ALAS 
algorithm was also validated using the high-fidelity Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) simulation 
running on a desktop [Smith2000]. 
This report documents follow-on work conducted in fiscal year 2013. In this work we (1) 
analyzed the use of the ALAS algorithm in the context of various runway spacings, (2) explored 
the potential benefits of using echelon spacing on parallel approaches, (3) investigated the 
potential benefits (e.g. lower minima) of a hybrid procedure where both echelon spacing is used 
until reaching a distance of 1 NM from the threshold and then the ALAS algorithm is applied, and 
(4) developed a new runway conformance algorithm for an offset runway. 
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2. SAPA Procedure For Various Runway Spacings 
In this section we use both fast-time and high-fidelity simulation to investigate the capability 
of the ALAS alerting algorithm to maintain safety for various runway spacings.  The fast-time 
simulation provides statistically-significant evidence while the high-fidelity simulation is used to 
confirm the results of the fast-time simulation. 
2.1.  Fast Time Simulation  
In our previous work [Perry2013] we developed a fast time simulation to test the performance of 
the ALAS algorithm for a runway spacing of 750 ft.   A worst-case analysis was performed using 
this simulation and the CMF high-fidelity simulation.   The trajectories generated by the fast-time 
simulation did not match the CMF trajectories because the kinematic models used in the tAlas 
simulation were too simple.   In this work, we have improved the tAlas simulation [Perry2013] in 
7 ways:  
1. It can now run as a Monte Carlo simulation in addition to a worst-case simulation.  
2. The kinematic turn was improved to include roll-in and roll-out.  (This change resulted 
in an escape maneuver that more closely matches the trajectory generated in the CMF 
high-fidelity simulation).  
3. The vertical acceleration ramps up for escapeVsRampTime seconds.   
4. ADS-B latency times were added.  
5. ADS-B position errors are modeled.   
6. The ground speed profile was improved.  
7. The total system error (TSE) decreases linearly as the aircraft approaches the runway 
(see Figure 2-1).  TSE has a value of 25 ft at the runway and 131 ft at 5 NM away.  
The threshold TSE is a little below the acceptable TSE of 27 ft for touchdown 
[Kayton1997] and the 5 NM TSE matches the observed 40 m TSE for RNP legs in the 
terminal area [MITRE2013]. 
 
Figure 2-1: Total System Error decreases as the aircraft approaches its runway 
 
We have applied the tAlas simulation to two situations: (1) various  parallel runways spacings 
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using a 3 s ADS-B latency time consistent with the FAA ADS-B Rule [FAA2010 & RTCA2011]  
and (2) various parallel runways spacings using a 1.5 s ADS-B latency time achievable with state-
of-the-art technology that complies with standard DO-260B [RTCA2002, RTCA2009, and 
RTCA2011].   
The revised tAlas can execute about 10,000 parallel approaches per minute, which is roughly 
half the number of the previous version of the simulation.   
2.1.1. ALAS Algorithm Parameters 
The ALAS algorithm has remained unchanged since our previous report [Perry2013] except 
that we have added a capability to perform conformance monitoring for an offset approach (See 
Appendix A).  For the reader’s convenience we restate the meaning of the ALAS algorithm 
parameters in this section. 
The ALAS parameters fall into three broad categories: (1) parameters that define the line-
based conflict detection region, (2) parameters that control the algorithm, and (3) parameters used 
by the runway conformance tests.  
Line-based Detection 
Parameter 
Meaning Default Value 
ln_front_buffer_red Length of the red-alert buffer in front of aircraft  10,000 ft 
ln_back_buffer_red Length of  red-alert buffer in back of aircraft  800 ft 
ln_T_red Lookahead time for red alert 15 s 
ln_front_buffer_yellow Length of yellow-alert buffer in front of aircraft  10000 ft 
ln_back_buffer_yellow Length of yellow-alert buffer in back of aircraft  1400 ft 
ln_T_yellow Lookahead time for yellow alert 35 s 
 
Internal Parameters Meaning Default Value 
useAbsDistAwayAlg True if additional distance test is used true 
initHeight Altitude difference where algorithm turns on MAX_VALUE 
numPtsTrkRateCalc Number of data points used in track rate 
calculation 
3  
maxPhi Highest bank angle used in search 40 
phiIncr Bank angle increment in search 5 
trackRateThreshold Track rate threshold that triggers the bank-angle 
sweeep search 
1.0/s 
absDistRed Mininimum horizontal distance that triggers a red 
alert 
486.5 ft 
absDistYellow Mininimum horizontal distance that triggers a 
yellow alert 
545.4 ft 
 
Runway Conformance 
Parameter 
Meaning Default Value 
redRunwayDist Distance from centerline that triggers a red alert 170 ft 
yellowRunwayDist Distance from centerline that triggers a yellow alert 140 ft 
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We have changed one ALAS parameter, yellowRunwayDist,  from 132 ft to 140 ft.  This change 
was necessary to reduce nuisance yellow alerts in the presence of the newly added ADS-B 
position errors.   
2.1.2. The tALAS Simulator 
The test simulation for ALAS (tALAS) is based on kinematic models of the ownship and 
intruder aircraft trajectories.  Figure 2-2 to Figure 2-4 illustrate these models and identify some of 
the key parameters.   
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The flight trajectory for the ownship is a straight-line descent following the glide path with an 
optional escape maneuver.  The trajectory for the intruder can be either a normal or a blundered 
landing approach.  The trajectories are specified separately and are independently executed until 
there is a red alert from ALAS, which triggers an escape maneuver by the ownship.  The 
following paragraphs describe the trajectory parameters for the ownship and intruder aircraft. 
2.1.2.1. tAlas Trajectories 
A trajectory has independent forward and lateral components.  The forward trajectory 
component specifies the desired path of travel.  The lateral component simulates the tracking 
error or wandering that happens due to, for example, wind gusts or control system limit cycles.  A 
simple sinusoidal oscillation model is used for the lateral deviation.  As shown in Figure 2-3, this 
lateral oscillation is superposed on the forward trajectory and is specified by three parameters: 
peak amplitude, time period, and phase offset.  The amplitude of the lateral oscillation decays 
linearly as the aircraft approach the runways to simulate an increase in accuracy and the aircraft 
actually touching down on their respective runways.  The trajectories for the ownship and 
intruder have independently specified lateral oscillations.  Vector addition is used to combine the 
forward and lateral components for a trajectory’s position and velocity. 
 The ownship landing trajectory is specified relative to the position and heading for landing on 
the runway.  The position of the runway is specified by the touchdown point, denoted SOSRunway in 
Figure 2-2.  The runway heading is denoted OSRunway.  The initial position SOSInitial and velocity 
VOSInitial are specified to match the desired descent profile with a specified glideslope angle.  An 
escape is triggered by a red alert from ALAS with a specified pilot delay from the time of the 
alert to the beginning of the maneuver.  An escape maneuver consists of a vertical climb at a 
constant vertical acceleration and an optional turn away from the intruder.  The vertical 
acceleration model has a ramp-up delay after which the acceleration is sustained until the vertical 
speed reaches a specified value.  If the escape is initiated above the optional designated minimum 
altitude for an escape turn, the ownship turns to heading escape with bank angle escape.  
Otherwise, the escape maneuver does not include a change in heading.  A turn has an optional roll 
time to simulate the time for the bank angle to reach escape.  After completing the escape 
maneuver, the ownship continues in a straight line with the specified heading and climbing.   
The intruder trajectory is a straight-line descent with an optional blunder.  In Figure 2-2, the 
runway touchdown point and heading are denoted SISRunway and ISRunway.  The initial position 
SOSInitial and velocity VOSInitial are specified to match the desired descent profile with a specified 
glideslope angle.  A blunder consists of a turn inward toward the ownship with a bank angle IS 
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turn and a roll time.  The turn is executed from time T1 to T2 after which the intruder continues 
in a straight line.  The blunder may also include a leveling out component beginning at time T1 + 
TLevel with an optional ramp up delay in the vertical acceleration and continuing until a constant 
altitude is reached.     
At the beginning of a landing case, the aircraft are positioned on the glidepath at or beyond the 
FAF point with the aircraft with lower approach speed ahead of the aircraft with higher approach 
speed.  Both aircraft begin the scenario at approximately the same ground speed (between 175 KT 
and 185 KT) and decelerate to reach their respective approach speeds at or before the SAP point.  
The vertical speed is coordinated with the ground speed to ensure that the aircraft remain on the 
glidepath.  Alternatively, the aircraft may be initially positioned just before the SAP point with 
their respective final approach speeds. 
2.1.2.2. tAlas ADS-B Error Model 
The tAlas simulation incorporates an ADS-B model with position update delay and error 
components [Eftekari2008].  The position update delay is a single parameter that covers the end-
to-end processing and communication delay.  The position error model has only a horizontal bias 
component and no altitude error component.  The horizontal position error has two components, a 
bias that remains constant for an entire trajectory and a jitter component that is recomputed every 
simulation step.  The horizontal bias is modeled in polar coordinates with radial and angular 
coordinates (r, ɵ) given by r = N(0, σHFOM) and ɵ = U(0, 2π), where r follows a Normal 
distribution with 0 mean and σHFOM standard deviation, and ɵ has a uniform distribution around a 
full circle.  The parameter σHFOM denotes the standard deviation of the GPS horizontal figure of 
merit (HFOM).  The jitter component of the position error is an additional radial error term given 
by  = {-0.05σHFOM for p ≤ 0.5, 0.05σHFOM for p > 0.5}, where p = U(0, 1).  There is no jitter for 
the angular position error.  The reported ADS-B position in Cartesian coordinates is given by 
(xADS-B, yADS-B) with xADS-B = x + ex and yADS-B = y + ey, where (x, y) is the actual horizontal 
position and (ex, ey) is the position error given by ex = (r + )cos(ɵ) and ey = (r + )sin(ɵ).   
2.1.2.3. tAlas Configuration and Parameters 
The tAlas simulation has a wide range of scenario configuration options.  The basic 
parameters that change from one case (or trial) to the next during a run specify the initial 
positions and speeds of the aircraft and the timing of the blunder.  The parameter values for a 
particular trial can be selected either randomly with specified distributions or deterministically 
within a discretized value range.  Runs with random parameter values are intended to determine 
the probability distribution of the minimum distance and the probability of violating the collision 
zone.  Runs with deterministic parameter selection are intended to explore a range of possible 
landing cases and discovering worst-case conditions for safety.  Additional simulation parameters 
which remain constant during a set of trials specify the runway spacing, landing trajectories 
(including headings and glideslope angles), escape and blunder maneuvers, maximum ground 
speed difference for final approach, lateral tracking error, ADS-B performance (including 
position error and latency), and ALAS configuration. 
The simulation is instrumented to collect data on false alarms, missed alerts, and the distance 
of closest approach.  tAlas also incorporates a collision zone around the aircraft according to the 
descriptions given in [FAA2011].  Two collision zone models are available in tAlas: a sphere or a 
cylinder.  For each test trial case, tALAS determines: the time of closest approach and the 
corresponding distance in 3D space, as well as the horizontal and vertical distances; whether there 
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was an intrusion into the collision zone; whether the intruder crossed the ownship’s centerline and 
the corresponding time of crossing; the time of the first yellow (i.e., level 1) alert; the time of first 
red (i.e., level 2) alert; whether a given red alert was not preceded by a yellow alert; the elapsed 
time from the yellow alert to the red alert; the elapsed time from the red alert to the time the 
intruder crossed the ownship’s centerline; whether there was a red alert without a blunder (i.e., a 
false alarm); and whether there was a violation without a red alert (i.e., a missed alert).  tAlas is 
also instrumented to compute the probability of violation of the collision zone.  For a set of test 
cases, tALAS can identify the case with the overall minimum approach distance and present a 
complete analysis for it.  tALAS generates the test trajectories as time-indexed state sequences.  
These sequences are processed by the instrumentation, and they can also be written to output files 
for post-run visualization and analysis.   
2.1.2.4. Blunder Trajectory Parameters  
The tAlas simulation generates blunders using three time parameters: 
  T1 = Start Time of Intrusion (s) 
  T2 = Duration of Intrusion Turn (s) 
  T3 = Duration after turn (s)  
 
The horizontal profile of a blunder trajectory is illustrated in Figure 2-6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Horizontal View for a Blunder Trajectory 
tALAS can also create blunders where the intruder’s altitude levels out at some point or where 
it continues to follow its normal vertical profile.  If a vertical level-out is specified then the 
vertical profile is as shown in Figure 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Vertical View for a Blunder Trajectory with a Level-out Component 
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The TLevel parameter, which specifies the time the level-out begins, can appear anytime after 
T1, the beginning of the intrusion.  If a vertical level-out is not specified, then the vertical profile 
is as shown in Figure 2-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Vertical Profile for a Blunder Trajectory without a Level-out Component 
The following is stated at the FAA Flight Systems Laboratory, Closely Spaced Parallel 
Operations (CSPO) website [FAA-CSPO]: 
A blunder occurs when one aircraft on a parallel approach turns toward another aircraft on 
the adjacent approach.  Blunder angle severity and frequency are key parameters in the 
determination of parallel runway spacing.  Blunder data has been collected in its current 
format since 2008.  As of July 31, 2011, there have been over 1.4 million Simultaneous 
Independent Parallel Instrument Approach (SIPIA) Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
operations recorded in less than visual conditions.  Of those approaches, there have been 60 
confirmed blunders which varied in frequency and severity.  The verified blunders 
predominantly occurred at angles between 5° and 35°, with a majority occurring in the 5° to 
15° range.  Until 2010, the blunder assumption used for fast time simulations was fixed at 30°, 
a worst case assumption made in the late 1990’s necessary to meet the agreed upon level of 
safety.  The assumption was needed since there was no blunder data available at that time.  
The updated blunder distributions determined from the data collected, along with other 
updates to model parameters, has contributed to more realistic fast-time simulations and 
analysis. 
In our simulations we have set maxT2 = 14 seconds and uniformly sampled the turn time T2 
from [1, maxT2].  We uniformly sample the intruder bank angle between 5 and 30 degrees.  This 
approach results in incidence angles up to 47° with an average incidence angle of 11° which is 
consistent with the fact that the majority of the historic blunders are within 5° to 15°.  We believe 
that our blunder model is conservative because larger incidence angles are more difficult to 
defend against.  Kinematically, incidence angles larger than 35° can be achieved, especially at 
larger runway separations.   
2.1.2.5. Escape Maneuver Parameters  
The parameters in Table 2-1 characterize the escape maneuver that was used. 
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Table 2-1: Escape Maneuver Parameters 
Parameter Meaning Nominal Value 
escapePilotDelay Time for pilot to react (s) 0 
escapeTrack Target track delta () 45 
escapeBankAngle Bank Angle of Escape Turn () 30 
escapeRollTime Time for Rollout to Complete(s) 6 
escapeVsGoal Target vertical speed (fpm) 2000 
escapeVsAccel The vertical acceleration (m/s2) 2.0 
escapeVsRampTime Time to ramp up to vsAccel (s) 4.0 
 
2.1.2.6. Monte Carlo Simulation: Random Generation of Parameter Values 
A probabilistic analysis can be obtained by using random sampling of the parameters over the 
parameter ranges.  In our Monte Carlo experiments, we used the ranges in Table 2-2.  
Table 2-2: tALAS Trajectory Parameters (Monte Carlo) 
Parameter Meaning Min Value Max Value 
T1 Start Time of Intrusion (s) 0 Computed 
(Description given below) 
T2 Duration of Intrusion Turn (s) 1 14 
T3 Duration after turn (s) 20 20 
bankAngle Bank Angle of Intrusion () 5 30 
Peak Max Trajectory error (ft) 131 131 
Period Period of Trajectory error (s) 60 70 
Phase Phase of Trajectory error () -180 +180 
ownshipInitialSx Distance from runway (NM) 5.0 5.5 
intruderInitialSx Distance from runway (NM) 5.0 5.5 
InitialGs Ground Speed at FAF (KT) 175 185 
    
gsMean Mean GS at SAP  (KT) 130 130 
gsSigma Standard Deviation GS at SAP (KT) 10 10 
maxGsDiff Max GS Differential at SAP (KT) 20 20 
 
The ground speeds of the aircraft decrease from the FAF to the SAP.  The simulation starts 
each aircraft on the glideslope near the FAF.  The initial ground speed is uniformly sampled from 
an interval of 175 KT to 185 KT.  The speeds at the SAP are sampled from a normal distribution 
with a mean of gsMean and a standard deviation of gsSigma.  Samples that exceed the minimum 
or maximum are discarded.  Also the ground speeds are sampled such that their difference is less 
than or equal to maxGsDiff.  Once the ground speeds are selected, the time (T1_max) until the 
intruder reaches an altitude of minAltitudeBlunder is computed.  By default  minAltitudeBlunder 
is 0.  The blunder time (T1) is then uniformly sampled from the interval [0, T1_max].  After T1, 
the trial continues an additional extraTimePerTrial seconds, which is typically 90 seconds.  We 
allow blunders to occur when the intruder is close to the ground.  However, if the ownship is 
already on the ground and the intruder’s trajectory has not crossed the ownship’s centerline and 
there has been no loss of separation and no alert, this test case is not counted.  Removing these 
trials increases the loss of separation (LoS) probabilities slightly.  When the intruder hits the 
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ground, its trajectory is continued at altitude 0.  This allows for a collision after the intruder hits 
the ground and skids into the ownship. 
2.1.3. Results from tAlas Simulations For Various Runway Spacings 
In this section we present the tAlas estimates of the probability of a collision given a blunder 
for various runway spacings.  We have chosen a target probability of 1E-5/blunder because 
historical data suggests that the blunder rate is less than 1E-4/landing.  This gives us an overall 
probability of failure of less than 1E-9/landing.  In [Eftekari2011] a table is presented that 
summarizes the rates of aircraft blunders from recent historical data:   
Table 2-3: Summary of No Transgression Zone Violations 
Deviation 
(degrees ) 
FY2008 FY2009 Total Rate Per 
Approach 
< 10 12 8 20 2.55E-05 
10 – 19 2 6 8 1.02E-05 
20 - 29 0 4 4 5.09E-06 
Total 14 18 32 4.08E-05 
 
The blunder arrival rate averaged over both years for all deviations was 4.08E-05.  In 
[Eftekari2011], the authors argue that the first digit is uncertain, so they use a blunder rate of 1E-
5 and set a target blunder to collision rate of 1E-4.  In this paper, we decided to be more 
conservative and set the blunder rate at 1E-4/landing.  With this blunder rate, a collision rate of 
no greater than 1E-5/blunder is necessary in order to achieve an overall failure rate of 1E-
9/landing.   
2.1.3.1. Results for a 400-ft Spherical Protection Zone 
In this section the probability of the center of gravity of the intruder aircraft entering a 
spherical protection zone of radius 400 ft around the ownship is calculated using the tAlas 
simulation.  The probabilities and confidence limits were computed using Wilson’s Score Method 
[Wallis2013] at the 99% confidence level.  Each row of Table 2-4 was computed using 
10,000,000 simulated landings.  Acceptable collision probabilities are indicated in blue font and 
unacceptable probabilities are indicated in red.  
 
Table 2-4: Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Various Runway Spacing  
Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Num 
Failures 
Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
750 1.5 65,475 6.53E-03  2.55E-05 93.46 
850 1.5 11,169 1.12E-03  1.06E-05 178.74 
900 1.5 4,158 4.16E-04  6.44E-06 219.25 
950 1.5 1,395 1.40E-04  3.74E-06 258.65 
1000 1.5 395 3.99E-05  1.99E-06 301.21 
1050 1.5 141 9.84E-06  9.81E-07 316.55 
1100 1.5 28 3.24E-06  5.49E-07 331.37 
1150 1.5 7 1.14E-06  3.03E-07 350.87 
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Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Num 
Failures 
Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
     
1050 3.0 4,528 4.53E-04  6.73E-06 158.55 
1100 3.0 1,812 1.82E-04  4.26E-06 199.20 
1150 3.0 618 6.22E-05  2.49E-06 242.78 
1200 3.0 188 1.92E-05  1.38E-06 288.44 
1250 3.0 43 4.74E-06  6.72E-07 335.35 
1300 3.0 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 383.04 
 
Using this protection zone, a runway separation of 1100 ft or more is needed to reach the 
target probability of collision (i.e. less than 1E-05) for an ADS-B latency of 1.5 s.  If the ADS-B 
latency is 3 s, then a runway separation of 1200 ft is required. 
2.1.3.2. Results for the FAA Cylinder Protection Zone (SAPA Procedure) 
In the FAA document [FAA2011], a cylinder of radius 265 ft and height 160 ft is recommended 
for collision studies in the terminal area.   It is referred to as the Large Cylinder (or Large Hockey 
Puck). In this model a collision is assumed to occur when the center of gravity of the blundering 
aircraft penetrates the cylinder containing the target aircraft. Using this cylindrical protection 
zone, we obtain more optimistic results. Each row of table was generated using 10,000,000 
simulated landings. 
 
Using this protection zone, a runway separation of 950 ft or more is needed to reach the target 
probability of collision (i.e. less than 1E-05) for an ADS-B latency of 1.5 s.  If the ADS-B latency 
is 3 s, then a runway separation of 1150 ft is required. 
Table 2-5: Simulation Results for Various Runway Spacing:  Cylinder  
Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Num Los Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
750 1.5 5943 5.95E-04  7.71E-06 93.46 
850 1.5 679 6.83E-05  2.61E-06 178.74 
900 1.5 171 1.75E-05  1.32E-06 219.25 
950 1.5 29 3.34E-06  5.58E-07 258.65 
1000 1.5 2 6.38E-07  2.05E-07 301.21 
1050 1.5 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 316.55 
     
1050 3.0 375 3.79E-05  1.94E-06 158.55 
1100 3.0 115 1.19E-05  1.08E-06 199.20 
1150 3.0 24 2.84E-06  5.12E-07 242.78 
1200 3.0 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 288.44 
1250 3.0 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 335.35 
 
These results were obtained using a maximum ground speed difference of 20 KT at the SAP.  
We included this constraint because the SAPA procedure requires this limitation.  Removing this 
constraint gives us the following collision probabilities. 
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Table 2-6: Simulation Results for Various Runway Spacing:  Cylinder (With No Ground 
Speed Difference Constraint) 
Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Num Los Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
900 1.5 222 2.26E-05  1.50E-06 168.92 
950 1.5 52 5.64E-06  7.36E-07 209.21 
1000 1.5 10 1.44E-06  3.49E-07 252.98 
1050 1.5 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 263.79 
     
1050 3.0 397 4.01E-05  2.00E-06 125.60 
1100 3.0 145 1.49E-05  1.21E-06 163.67 
1150 3.0 30 3.44E-06  5.67E-07 206.35 
1200 3.0 6 1.04E-06  2.86E-07 251.74 
1250 3.0 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 298.61 
 
From Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 we can see that the SAPA ground speed difference constraint 
reduces the probability of collision slightly.  This maximum ground speed difference was 
primarily imposed to meet the wake vortex requirements, but it provides a minor benefit here as 
well.  Note that either way, a runway separation of 950 ft or more is needed to reach the target 
probability of collision (i.e. less than 1E-05) for an ADS-B latency of 1.5 s and a runway 
separation of 1150 ft is required if the ADS-B latency is 3 s. 
2.1.3.3. Results for the FAA Cylinder Protection Zone and Different Glideslopes 
In this section we present the results of simulations where the intruder’s glideslope is at 2.85° and 
the ownship’s glideslope at 3°.  The glideslopes at San Francisco International Airport (KSFO), 
one of the candidate airports for paired approach, were changed in August 2013 to these 
differentiated angles.  Differentiated glideslopes bring potential advantages to the procedure.  
When the trail is placed on the higher glideslope, its vertical separation from the lead increases 
with distance from the runway threshold.  Therefore, the trail aircraft has a larger vertical 
separation in those segments of the approach where the total system error (TSE) for each aircraft 
is also large.  Large TSE increases the probable loss of lateral separation between the two aircraft 
that can occur during normal operation.  This decreases the distance that a blundering aircraft or 
its wake must travel to cross the path of the trail aircraft.  However, since neither the wake nor 
blundering aircraft are assumed to ascend, additional vertical separation between the aircraft 
increases the possibility that ownship can maintain a safe vertical distance from the wake or 
blundering aircraft even if it the lateral separation drops below the protection zone radius.  A 
cylindrical protection zone of radius 265 ft and height 160 ft was used.  Each row of table was 
generated using 10,000,000 landings. 
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Table 2-7: Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Various Runway Spacing with Differing 
Glideslopes 
Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Num Los Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
750 1.5 4316 4.32E-04  6.57E-06 133.91 
850 1.5 299 3.03E-05  1.74E-06 206.88 
900 1.5 38 4.24E-06  6.34E-07 242.28 
950 1.5 3 7.38E-07  2.28E-07 281.18 
1000 1.5 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 323.15 
     
1000 3.0 526 5.30E-05  2.30E-06 149.79 
1050 3.0 129 1.33E-05  1.15E-06 183.14 
1100 3.0 22 2.64E-06  4.92E-07 222.62 
1150 3.0 2 6.38E-07  2.05E-07 263.71 
1200 3.0 0 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 288.44 
 
Comparing this table with Table 2-5 shows that the differing glideslopes provide about 50 ft 
less runway separation. 
2.1.4. Note Concerning Disabling Alert for Trailing Aircraft 
The runway performance monitor triggers an ALAS alert for the nearest traffic aircraft even if 
that aircraft is trailing the ownship by a large distance.  The question naturally arises whether 
there is a longitudinal distance at which the trailing aircraft can be safely ignored.  We explored 
this idea in the tAlas simulation.  Our first run was to disable the alert if the longitudinal distance 
between the aircraft was greater than 750 ft.  This led to a surprising result illustrated in Figure 
2-9. 
In this scenario, the intruder has the faster ground speed and is initially more than 750 ft 
behind the ownship.  After the intruder has crossed the path of the ownship, the intruder closes 
the gap between the two aircraft to a longitudinal distance less than 750 ft.  At this point, the 
Figure 2-9: Pathological scenario as a result of disabling alerting for trailing aircraft 
Motion 
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ALAS alert is no longer suppressed (see orange dot).  The escape maneuver follows shortly 
thereafter and a violation of the protection zone occurs.  Clearly, if the ownship had not executed 
the escape maneuver, no LoS would have occurred.  Now, there are several tests that could be 
performed to prevent this from occurring, but first we search for a minimal distance where this is 
not a problem.  
Table 2-8 shows the simulation results for a runway separation of 950 ft, 1.5 s latency and for 
various longitudinal cutoff distances.  Each row was calculated from 10,000,000 simulated 
landings.  Again, acceptable collision probabilities are indicated in blue font and unacceptable 
probabilities are indicated in red. 
Table 2-8: Simulation Results for 950 ft Runway with Various Rear Longitudinal Cutoff 
Distances 
Longitudinal Cutoff 
Distance (ft) 
Probability (large cylinder) Minimum 
Distance (ft) 
750 1.92E-02  4.34E-05 2.36 
1500 1.96E-03  1.40E-05 2.77 
2000 3.23E-04  5.68E-06 7.02 
2500 2.44E-05  4.71E-06 37.60 
3000 3.34E-06  5.58E-07 258.65 
3500 3.34E-06  5.58E-07 258.65 
 
From these results we see that an aircraft must be at least trailing 3000 ft or more 
longitudinally before it can be safely ignored.  If it is desirable to disable the ALAS alert for 
aircraft that are trailing behind, then some additional checks should be added to the ALAS 
conformance algorithm to insure that it does not engage after the intruder has passed the 
centerline of the ownship.    
2.2. High-fidelity Simulation Results 
The 2012 SAPA study [Perry2013] concluded that the SAPA procedure, which allows the trail 
aircraft to pass the lead aircraft, could not execute safely at a runway separation of 750 feet 
[Perry2013].  This follow-on study uses the high-fidelity, transport-class aircraft simulation in 
Langley's Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) to determine whether safe passing is feasible at a larger 
runway spacing of 1050 ft for next generation aircraft and whether aircraft adhering to the FAA 
rule on ADS-B [FAA2010] can safely pass at 1400 ft.   
The simulation setup is as described in the 2012 SAPA study [Perry2013] with some small 
adjustments.  In the 2012 SAPA study, the CMF simulation was configured to perform a 
simultaneous parallel approach to runways 28L and 28R at San Francisco International Airport 
(KSFO).  The lead aircraft was placed assigned to 28L and the trail aircraft was assigned to 28R.  
The high-fidelity transport model used in the CMF simulation only has the capability to automate 
instrument landing system (ILS) approaches.  Therefore, each aircraft maintains its lateral and 
vertical path using the localizer and glideslope signals respectively.  To provide 1050 ft and 1400 
ft runway spacing, the location of KSFO RWY28R and its ILS were shifted the necessary 
distance in the navigation database.  To model current generation aircraft complying with the 
FAA ADS-B Rule, the latency parameters for ADS-B and ALAS were modified as follows: 
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 Ownship State 
o Total Latency (Measurement to ALAS input): 1000 ms 
o Compensated Latency: 600 ms 
 Traffic State 
o ADS-B OUT 
 Total Latency (Measurement to Transmission): 2000 ms 
 Compensated Latency: 1400 ms 
o ADS-B IN 
 Total Latency (Reception to ALAS): 1000 ms 
 Compensated Latency: 600 ms 
The FAA rule-compliant ADS-B has an end-to-end latency of 3 seconds.  ADS-B latency 
parameters for the next generation aircraft is unchanged from the 2012 study and the end-to-end 
latency is 1.5 seconds. 
The method for selecting the initial condition for each run was also modified.  In the prior 
high-fidelity simulation study, the initial position of the trail aircraft was placed at the center of 
the front and rear gates.  In this simulation study, the trail aircraft was positioned to ensure a 
collision indication in the absence of an escape maneuver.  In other words, the initial position of 
the trail aircraft ensures that separation between lead and trail aircraft is less than 100 feet when 
the lead aircraft blunders onto the trail's path.  Thus, this simulation study can determine whether 
the collision can be avoided using ALAS and the escape maneuver.  However, this simulation 
study does not examine scenarios where the blunder does not lead to a collision in the absence of 
an escape maneuver.  Therefore, this study cannot assess whether there are circumstances under 
which the escape maneuver contributes to a collision that would not otherwise occur.  As with the 
2012 simulation study, this simulation study examined both ideal state inputs to ALAS and inputs 
with modeled avionics errors and latencies.  Furthermore, trials included execution of the blunder 
and escape maneuver using the stock flight control computer (normal turn) and using an outer-
loop control algorithm to superpose a wheel command (augmented turn).  All blunders were 
conducted as a 30 heading change, either while continuing to descend or while leveling off.  A 
blunder in the constant speed segment at 10 NM from the threshold and a blunder after the SAP at 
2.5 NM from the threshold were both analyzed.  
Table 2-9 through Table 2-12 show the results for 1050 ft runway separation using next-
generation avionics with an end-to-end ADS-B latency of 1.5 seconds.  Table 2-13 through Table 
2-16 show the results for 1400 ft runway separation using current-rule compliant ADS-B with an 
end-to-end latency of 3 seconds.  To identify collisions, a 400-foot collision sphere around the 
aircraft was used.  Within the 96 runs conducted for 1050 ft separation, there are 10 collision 
indications (in red font).  All ten indications occur using normal autopilot turns against blunders 
where the lead stops its descent.  Only one occurs with ideal inputs; the others occur with 
modeled avionics errors and latencies.  These collisions, however, are avoided under more 
aggressive maneuvering (augmented turn).  There are also five false alerts.  False alerts are 
indicated where the alert time is negative.  (The latest version of ALAS used to generate the fast-
time results in this paper does not produce false alarms when rerun against these CMF 
trajectories.  The ALAS algorithm was adjusted as a consequence of these runs.)  Within the 96 
runs conducted for 1400 ft separation, there are eight collision indications.  Again, these 
indications occur during normal autopilot turns when the blundering aircraft stops its descent.  
Furthermore, all occur with modeled avionics errors and latencies.  No collision indications occur 
under more aggressive maneuvering (augmented turn).  In addition, no false positive alerts 
occurred. 
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These results suggest that it may be possible to perform the SAPA procedure safely at 1050 ft 
separation with next-generation avionics and at 1400 ft separation with current-rule compliance 
ADS-B OUT if the automated escape maneuver is programmed to turn more aggressively than 
under normal autopilot operation.   
 
Table 2-9: 1050 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Descending During Constant 
Speed Segment, 1.5 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.12 1038 617 1.62 1034 753 
130 / 122 1.70 1046 734 1.08 1038 880 
138 / 130 1.92 1061 741 1.32 1047 866 
145 / 138 2.00 1063 740 1.36 1051 838 
153 / 145 1.86 1087 759 1.60 1069 791 
160 / 153 2.74 1116 693 1.94 1093 824 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 3.12 1027 524 3.12 1009 525 
130 / 122 3.20 1036 585 2.58 1025 690 
138 / 130 3.42 1051 591 2.82 1031 668 
145 / 138 3.50 1052 584 2.86 1034 585 
153 / 145 2.86 1084 630 3.10 1050 563 
160 / 153 3.74 1109 604 2.94 1083 641 
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Table 2-10: 1050 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Level During Constant Speed 
Segment, 1.5 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.24 1044 377 1.24 1040 770 
130 / 122 1.96 1061 509 1.02 1047 819 
138 / 130 1.58 1062 543 1.24 1045 803 
145 / 138 1.56 1064 523 1.28 1057 717 
153 / 145 1.66 1083 555 0.94 1082 776 
160 / 153 2.60 1103 473 1.54 1089 752 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 3.24 1035 246 2.74 1019 539 
130 / 122 2.96 1053 329 3.02 1019 512 
138 / 130 3.58 1048 252 2.74 1027 573 
145 / 138 3.56 1048 235 2.78 1036 453 
153 / 145 3.16 1075 324 2.44 1069 495 
160 / 153 4.10 1096 232 2.54 1081 560 
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Table 2-11: 1050 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Descending During Final 
Approach Segment, 1.5 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 1.44 1567 1201 1.56 1181 904 
130 / 122 1.70 1760 1390 1.48 1230 899 
138 / 130 1.54 1765 1390 1.10 1138 895 
145 / 138 1.86 1111 728 1.52 1201 860 
153 / 145 1.90 1154 642 1.12 1192 833 
160 / 153 1.64 1592 1157 1.44 1147 785 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.94 1550 1041 2.56 1167 763 
130 / 122 3.20 1735 1212 1.98 1223 802 
138 / 130 3.04 1743 1214 2.60 1109 744 
145 / 138 -9.64 1143 1143 3.02 1166 639 
153 / 145 -16.10 1261 1253 -13.88 1266 1262 
160 / 153 3.14 1561 1014 2.94 1104 577 
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Table 2-12: 1050 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Level During Final Approach 
Segment, 1.5 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 1.74 1199 720 1.24 1197 941 
130 / 122 1.80 1205 703 1.40 1229 810 
138 / 130 1.42 1134 602 1.32 1149 837 
145 / 138 1.88 1187 586 1.02 1209 894 
153 / 145 1.98 1165 501 1.16 1198 804 
160 / 153 1.74 1116 463 1.00 1165 773 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.74 1187 600 2.74 1177 739 
130 / 122 2.30 1197 631 2.90 1196 576 
138 / 130 3.42 1090 387 2.82 1111 672 
145 / 138 3.88 1148 342 2.52 1182 674 
153 / 145 -15.02 1264 1256 -12.84 1263 1260 
160 / 153 3.24 1080 255 2.50 1127 552 
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Table 2-13: 1400 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Descending During Constant 
Speed Segment, 3 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.02 1377 869 1.46 1399 1123 
130 / 122 1.82 1398 992 1.28 1390 1195 
138 / 130 2.08 1410 1001 1.50 1397 1183 
145 / 138 1.70 1414 1043 1.18 1406 1198 
153 / 145 1.96 1435 1033 1.36 1425 1169 
160 / 153 2.36 1467 1014 1.76 1453 1196 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 6.02 1290 445 5.46 1271 585 
130 / 122 5.82 1333 556 5.28 1283 649 
138 / 130 6.58 1324 493 5.00 1307 701 
145 / 138 6.20 1341 556 5.18 1298 588 
153 / 145 5.96 1376 632 5.36 1315 564 
160 / 153 6.36 1401 576 5.76 1334 554 
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Table 2-14: 1400 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Level During Constant Speed 
Segment, 3 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 2.14 1410 724 1.08 1404 1143 
130 / 122 1.88 1424 831 1.36 1405 1134 
138 / 130 2.00 1426 833 1.02 1403 1184 
145 / 138 1.58 1435 877 1.12 1421 1098 
153 / 145 1.70 1457 921 1.24 1440 1082 
160 / 153 2.64 1470 850 1.34 1449 1143 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 6.14 1324 130 5.58 1264 502 
130 / 122 4.88 1380 349 5.36 1280 561 
138 / 130 6.00 1357 254 5.02 1299 648 
145 / 138 6.08 1357 203 5.12 1296 463 
153 / 145 5.20 1410 364 5.24 1310 449 
160 / 153 6.64 1404 242 5.34 1337 489 
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Table 2-15: 1400 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Descending During Final 
Approach Segment, 3 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 1.82 1573 1124 1.12 1558 1337 
130 / 122 1.44 1606 1190 1.36 1602 1296 
138 / 130 1.62 1530 1090 1.16 1509 1250 
145 / 138 1.82 1566 1046 1.36 1578 1258 
153 / 145 1.88 1535 960 1.48 1552 1151 
160 / 153 1.64 1489 959 1.34 1519 1155 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 5.82 1479 764 5.12 1443 865 
130 / 122 5.94 1493 786 5.36 1456 803 
138 / 130 6.12 1398 669 5.16 1356 865 
145 / 138 5.82 1457 649 5.36 1419 731 
153 / 145 0.88 1549 1024 5.48 1381 591 
160 / 153 5.64 1365 524 4.84 1374 680 
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Table 2-16: 1400 ft Runway Separation - 30 Blunder While Level During Final Approach 
Segment, 3 s total latency 
 Ideal Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 1.48 1580 1112 1.20 1562 1313 
130 / 122 1.78 1590 1082 1.40 1611 1213 
138 / 130 1.50 1512 960 0.92 1532 1251 
145 / 138 1.78 1566 959 1.40 1584 1222 
153 / 145 2.00 1549 863 1.22 1587 1180 
160 / 153 1.66 1490 826 1.00 1546 1149 
 
 Modeled Avionics Input to ALAS 
Normal Turn Augmented Turn 
Approach 
Speeds of 
Fast/Slow (KT) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
Time to 
Alert (s) 
3D Distance 
at Alert (ft) 
Closest 3D 
Distance (ft) 
122 / 114 4.98 1513 743 4.70 1469 892 
130 / 122 3.78 1552 861 5.40 1454 661 
138 / 130 5.50 1400 522 5.42 1340 795 
145 / 138 3.78 1527 692 5.40 1415 689 
153 / 145 6.00 1431 380 5.22 1426 626 
160 / 153 5.16 1388 348 5.00 1370 630 
 
2.3. Observations 
The fast-time and high-fidelity simulations provide evidence that it will be safe to use the 
SAPA procedure at 1050 ft separations with next-generation avionics and at 1400 ft separations 
with current-rule compliance ADS-B OUT with an aggressive escape maneuver.  The fast time 
simulations suggest that the SAPA procedure may be used down to 1150 ft separations with 
current-rule avionics and down to 950 ft separations with future avionics, though this has not yet 
been validated in the CMF high-fidelity simulation.  It seems likely that the use of different 
glideslopes will reduce the allowed separations by another 50 ft.  These results depend upon an 
automatic, immediate initiation of the escape maneuver.  We have modeled the roll time of the 
turn maneuver and the ramp up of the vertical acceleration in the escape maneuver, but we have 
not included any delay due to a pilot.  We have also assumed that this maneuver can be 
performed for all possible blunders.    
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3. Evaluation of Echelon Spacing for Straight-In Procedures 
After initial results of the tAlas simulation indicated that the safe runway separation for the 
SAPA procedure was 1100 ft (see Section 2.1.3.1), NASA was encouraged to investigate the 
benefits of using echelon spacing.  Echelon spacing requires the trail aircraft to maintain a 
collision-safe distance from the lead aircraft.  This section uses statistical analysis to determine 
the runway separations under which echelon spacing is feasible.  Statistical analysis was used in 
lieu of a Monte-Carlo simulation for two reasons.  First, neither the tAlas nor CMF simulations 
contain a wake transport model useful in determining the wake-safe boundary.  Both simulations 
place the aircraft within pre-established wake-safe boundaries.  In the 2012 SAPA Study [Perry 
2012], these fast-time simulations used wake-safe boundaries determined from a previous Monte-
Carlo study performed by Johnson, et. al. [Johnson 2010].  However, Johnson's results could not 
be reused for analyzing the Echelon approach due to a difference in wake transport model (see 
section 3.4.1) and in operating assumptions including total system error, tolerable crosswind, and 
acceptable probability of a wake encounter.  Second, though a new Monte-Carlo simulation could 
have been developed to determine new wake-safe boundaries, such a simulation would be subject 
to the same limitations as previous simulations.  Namely, the number of runs that are required to 
characterize, with confidence, wake-safe boundaries with a rarity of 1 encounter in 1 billion 
flights necessitate long run times.  The long run-times hamper iterative redesign of the procedure 
to converge on a feasible solution.  An analytical model can estimate, very rapidly, the wake-safe 
boundary for a given probability of a wake encounter.         
Figure 3-1 depicts the relative geometry of the aircraft in the paired-approach with echelon 
spacing.  The trail aircraft must maintain longitudinal distance from the lead aircraft in a range 
defined to avoid two hazards, collision and wake.  To avoid collision, the trail aircraft must 
Figure 3-1: Paired Approach with Echelon Spacing 
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maintain a sufficient distance from the lead such that the lead will not collide with the trail if the 
lead blunders towards the trail's path.  To avoid wake, the trail aircraft must be close enough to 
the lead that the wake of the lead aircraft passes behind the trail in the presence of adverse 
crosswind.  The trail must maintain its separation in this range from the loss of altitude separation 
until the lead aircraft crosses the threshold (TBR1).  In the constant speed segments, the two 
aircraft are flying the same speed and the trail can maintain a constant spacing behind the lead.  
However, after the final approach fix (FAF), both aircraft will slow to their final approach speed.  
By design, the final approach speed of the trail aircraft is greater than that of the lead aircraft.  
Therefore, longitudinal separation between the lead and trail will decrease throughout final 
approach.  The trail aircraft must accommodate this compression of longitudinal separation 
before reaching the FAF to ensure that it will not drop below the collision-safe distance before 
reaching the threshold.  This compression distance grows larger as the approach speed of the lead 
decreases and as the difference in approach speed between the two vehicles increases.     
To determine the feasibility of the procedure for a given pair of aircraft, we must define the 
collision-safe distance, the longitudinal compression distance, and the wake-safe distance.  Figure 
3-2 depicts how the collision-safe distance, the longitudinal compression distance, and the wake-
safe distance define the required separation between the lead and trail aircraft at the FAF.  The 
collision-safe distance and longitudinal compression distance define the front-gate.  The wake-
safe distance defines the rear-gate.  However, the procedure becomes infeasible for a given pair 
of aircraft if the distance between the front and rear gate is not long enough to accommodate the 
deviation in longitudinal separation that can normally occur.  Otherwise, the procedure may 
suffer an ineffectual rate of breakouts.  In fact, Section 3.4.3 uses the desired breakout rate to 
define the normal deviation in longitudinal separation.  Some of the variables that determine these 
distances are subject to variation.  These variables include the total system error (TSE) of each 
aircraft (including its components of flight technical error [FTE] and navigation error [NE]), the 
error in the ADS-B reported position of the lead aircraft, and the variation in the actual airspeeds 
of the lead and trail aircraft.  Therefore, given a distribution function for these variables (usually 
assumed to be normal), one can statistically analyze the feasibility of the procedure for a desired 
                                                     
 
1 The angle at which the lead aircraft can safely intercept the path of the trail diminishes near the ground.  
More aggressive maneuvers will lead to ground contact.  For this reason, it may be possible to lift 
longitudinal spacing requirements earlier in the procedure.   
Figure 3-2: Components of Required Longitudinal Separation at the FAF 
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probability of successful completion.  
3.1. The Collision-Safe Distance 
Eftekari, et al. [Eftekari2011] performed an assessment of collision-free separation for parallel 
approaches at closely spaced parallel runways.  Eftekari defined collision-free as a collision 
probability of 10-9 or less divided between a blunder probability of 10-5 and a probability of 
collision after blunder of 10-4.  If a blunder can occur at any point in the procedure, this study 
concluded that the trail aircraft must maintain a longitudinal separation of 750 feet or more within 
the FAF when the runway spacing is 700 feet.  If blunders occur only outside the FAF, Eftekari 
determined that the longitudinal separation must be 1500 ft or more up to the FAF. 
Though Section 4.1 presents NASA's analysis of the collision-safe separation to support the 
parallel segment of the offset approach to low minima (which also apply to parallel approaches), 
that work was not completed in time to incorporate into the analysis in this section.  Therefore, 
the analysis in this section establishes a 750 ft minimum separation within the FAF and a 1500 ft 
minimum separation outside the FAF. 
3.2. Longitudinal Compression Distance 
Prior to the FAF, the trail aircraft uses speed management to actively control its longitudinal 
separation with the lead.  The trail aircraft stops active management of longitudinal separation 
when it reaches its final approach speed (by maintaining separation as the lead aircraft's 
decelerates) or when it reaches the FAF (if it has not detected deceleration by the lead).  The trail 
aircraft will then decelerate to its final approach speed and, since the procedure places the aircraft 
with the faster approach speed in the trail position, the longitudinal separation will decrease for 
the remainder of the procedure.  However, the trail aircraft continues to monitor the longitudinal 
separation and will breakout if it drops below the collision-free separation.  Therefore, to limit 
nuisance breakouts, the trail aircraft must position itself to accommodate the longitudinal 
compression before the aircraft begins to decelerate. 
If the aircraft accurately fly their planned approach speed to the threshold, then the 
longitudinal compression is characterized by the approach speeds of the two vehicles, the rate of 
deceleration, the minimum separation that must be maintained, the height to which minimum 
separation must be maintained, winds, and atmospheric density.  Winds and atmospheric density 
come into play because the approach speed is an equivalent airspeed, not a true ground speed.  
This analysis does not include winds.  Nevertheless, headwinds tend to increase the compression 
distance as it will lead to a decrease in the true ground speed of the lead aircraft and, therefore, 
increases the time that the trail spends encroaching on the lead.  Likewise, tailwinds would tend 
to decrease the compression distance. 
On the other hand, accounting for density with altitude is desirable.  At KSFO, assuming a 
1976 standard atmosphere, the equivalent airspeed at the FAF is about 3% lower than the true 
ground speed.  From the FAF to touchdown, the elapsed time to threshold is about 3 seconds 
shorter when one converts EAS to TAS than if one assumes that EAS = TAS.  The challenge, 
however, in computing compression distance by converting EAS to TAS is that the conversion 
value changes with altitude as density changes with altitude.  
Before incorporating the EAS to TAS conversion, let us first determine the kinematic 
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equations for the approach procedures assuming TAS = EAS.  As we will see later, we can 
formulate the EAS to TAS conversion in a way that allows us to use these same relations.  The 
flight of the lead aircraft is examined first and is shown in Figure 3-3.  The lead aircraft's speed 
schedule can be broken into three segments: a constant speed segment, a deceleration segment, 
and a final approach segment.  The constant speed segment captures the region from where the 
lead aircraft captures the glideslope until the final approach fix.  In this region, the aircraft flies a 
constant EAS assigned by air traffic control.  When the lead aircraft reaches the FAF, it begins 
the deceleration segment.  In this segment, the aircraft decelerates to its planned final approach 
speed.  The deceleration is modeled as a constant that completes the deceleration by the stabilized 
approach point (SAP) at 1000 ft AGL.  After the SAP, the aircraft is in the final approach 
segment and flies its planned final approach speed to the threshold.  The aircraft is expected to 
initiate a flare maneuver within the neighborhood of the threshold; however, the trail aircraft is no 
longer required to maintain separation at that point. 
 
To compute the compression distance at the FAF, first calculate the time it takes the lead 
aircraft to travel from the FAF to the threshold crossing height (TCH).  The time from FAF to 
TCH is divided into two computations: time from FAF to SAP and time from SAP to TCH.  The 
time from FAF to SAP assumes a constant deceleration from the constant segment speed (Vc) to 
the final approach speed (Vf).  Thus, the average speed from FAF to SAP is ½ [Vc + Vf].  Given 
that the FAF and SAP are defined by height above the runway, the distance between these points 
is a function of their heights and the glideslope angle.  The time is given by: 
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 (3-1) 
where, 
 zFAF  is the height of the final approach fix in feet, normally 1800 ft 
 zSAP  is the height of the stabilized approach point in feet, normally 1000 ft 
Figure 3-3: Speed Profiles of Lead and Trail Aircraft 
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 	   is the glideslope angle, normal 3 
 Vc  is the constant segment speed in knots, nominally 180 KT 
 Vf  is the final approach speed in knots 
t  is the flight time in seconds 
Similarly, the time from SAP to TCH is given by: 
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 (3-2) 
where, zTCH is the TCH in feet, nominally 50 feet but at KSFO it is 57 ft for the lead aircraft's 
runway RWY28L and 55 ft for the trail aircraft's runway RWY28R.  The total flight time from 
FAF to TCH for the lead aircraft is therefore, 
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 (3-3) 
For example, if Vc is 180 KT and Vf is 120 KT, then the tlead  is 149.3 seconds. 
Next, given a starting height at the collision-free distance from the threshold (zCFH), calculate 
where the trail aircraft would have been tlead seconds in the past.  The conditions on the time and 
rate of deceleration for the trail aircraft complicate this computation.  The trail aircraft decelerates 
at the same rate as the lead aircraft when and if it detects the deceleration of the lead aircraft prior 
to the trail aircraft reaching the FAF; otherwise, the trail aircraft decelerates independently.  One 
key parameter governing this condition is tdelay, the time delay in the response of the trail aircraft 
to changes in the true state of the lead aircraft.  For this study, tdelay is assumed to be 5.0 seconds 
for current generation aircraft and 3.5 seconds for next generation aircraft.  Table 3-1 provides a 
breakdown of the estimated tdelay. 
Table 3-1: Estimate of Response Delay in Dependent Operations 
 Current Generation Next Generation 
ADS-B OUT Latency (from 
navigation measurement) 
2.0 s 0.7 s 
ADS-B IN Latency 0.5 s 0.5 s 
ALAS Latency 0.5 s 0.3 s 
Pilot Reaction Time 2.0 s 2.0 s 
Total 5.0 s 3.5 s 
 
Let tI-Trail be the independent flight time of the trail aircraft from the FAF to zCFH.  The trail 
aircraft will decelerate independently if (tlead - tI-Trail) < tdelay.  Thus, we first compute tI-Trail.  The 
equations are identical to those for tlead but zCFH is substituted for zTCH.   
 ݖ஼ிு ൌ ݖ்஼ு ൅݀௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ሺݐܽ݊ ߛሻ ൌ ͷͷ݂ݐ ൅ ͹ͷͲ݂ݐሺݐܽ݊ ͵ιሻ ൌ ͻͶǤ͵݂ݐ (3-4) 
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If the value of tI-trail reveals that the trail aircraft will perform an independent deceleration, then 
the position of the  x-axis runway coordinate of the trail aircraft when the lead is at the FAF is: 
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where XFAF is the x-axis runway coordinate of the FAF, nominally -33,392 ft or -5.5 NM; at 
RWY28R, it is -33297 ft.  The above equation is valid as long as tI-trail ≤ tlead which should be true 
as long as the final approach speed for the trail aircraft is greater than that of the lead aircraft.  
However, the actual speeds of each aircraft can deviate from their planned speeds.  If the trail and 
lead aircraft have the same planned final approach speed, then the actual speed of the trail aircraft 
can be lower than planned and, therefore, lower than the actual speed of the lead aircraft.  
Nevertheless, this situation does not need to be accounted for because as stated in section 3.1, the 
trail must also maintain a collision-free separation at the FAF of 1500 ft.  In fact, given that (tlead  - 
tI-trail) ≤ tdelay, the maximum longitudinal separation at the FAF for independent deceleration of the 
trail aircraft is Vc tdelay.   For next-generation aircraft, a Vc > 254 KT would be required to exceed 
the minimum separation of 1500 ft.  That speed is well outside expected variation about the 
CONOPS designed value of 180 KT [MITRE2013]; therefore, an aircraft pair that could get close 
enough to allow independent deceleration of the trail, must instead be separated by 1500 ft at the 
FAF and will perform a dependent deceleration.  For current generation aircraft, a Vc > 178 KT is 
required to exceed the minimum separation of 1500 ft.  This is within the expected variation 
about design value of 180 KT; therefore, it remains possible for current generation aircraft to be 
positioned for an independent deceleration. 
If the trail aircraft will perform a dependent deceleration with the lead, the trail aircraft's total 
flight time, tD-trail, can be broken into three components: tdelay - the delay in dependent operation 
defined in the previous paragraph, tdecel - the time to decelerate to the final approach speed, and 
tfinal - the time flying at the final approach speed.  tdecel is computed using the deceleration of the 
lead aircraft and the final approach speed of the trail aircraft: 
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Note that the equation for alead produces an acceleration in units of kt/s so that the equation for 
tdecel produces a time in units of seconds.  Now, tfinal becomes the remaining time, tlead - tdelay - tdecel.  
With these times, the x-axis runway coordinate of the trail aircraft performing a dependent 
deceleration can be computed: 
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The compression distance can now be computed for an aircraft pair: 
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The minimum value of dcompression is 750 ft since the minimum collision-free separation at the FAF 
is 1500 ft which is 750 ft greater than dcollision, the collision-free separation at the threshold.  Using 
the above equations, if the lead aircraft final approach speed is 120 KT and the trail aircraft final 
approach speed is 130 KT, then the following values would result for the current generation fleet: 
 tlead    = 149.3 seconds 
tI-trail   = 137.3 seconds, (tlead - tI-trail) = 12.0 seconds > tdelay so compute XD-trail 
tdecel   =   50.3 seconds 
XD-trail   = -36014 ft 
dcompression   =    1967 ft  
Next, incorporate the EAS to TAS conversion: 
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where 
, P, and T are the atmospheric density, pressure, and temperature respectively and the 
subscript zero indicates the sea-level value.  The second formulation allows the insertion of 
functions for temperature and pressure from the US Standard 1976 atmosphere model for 
altitudes below 36,152 ft [NOAA1976]: 
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where, 
 g = the standard acceleration due to free fall, 32.17404 ft/s2 
 h  = the geometric altitude, feet 
 L = the lapse rate, -3.56616x10-3 R/ft 
 P0 = sea-level pressure, 2116.22 psf 
 R = the gas constant for air, 1716.55915670803 ft2/(s2 R) 
  Re = the radius of the Earth, 20855531.5 ft 
 T0 = sea-level temperature, 518.67 R 
 H = the geopotential altitude, feet 
With these equations, the conversion from EAS to TAS becomes: 
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Equation 3-16 computes TAS as a function of geometric altitude.  To determine the distance 
traveled over a given time, we recognize that TAS is dr/dt where r is the distance along the 
glideslope.  Since the glideslope angle is constant, we can reformulate dr/dt in terms of geometric 
altitude using the relation h = r sin(	). 
 
்ܸ஺ௌ ൌ
݀ݎ
݀ݐ
ൌ ൬ ߛ
ܭܶ
݂݌ݏ
൰
݄݀
݀ݐ
ൌ ாܸ஺ௌඨ൬ͳ െ
ͳͶ͵Ǥ͵ͻͶ݄
݄ ൅ ʹͲͺͷͷͷ͵ͳǤͷ
൰
ିସǤଶହହ଼ଽ
 (3-17) 
 
න݀ݐ ൌ ݐ ൌ ൬
 ߛ
ாܸ஺ௌ
ܭܶ
݂݌ݏ
൰නඨ൬ͳ െ
ͳͶ͵Ǥ͵ͻͶ݄
݄ ൅ ʹͲͺͷͷͷ͵ͳǤͷ
൰
ସǤଶହହ଼ଽ
݄݀ (3-18) 
(Note the change of sign for the exponent in Equation 3-18.)  The integral for dh does not have a 
closed form solution.  However, a closed form approximation can be constructed by converting 
the integrand to a Taylor series and integrating the first two terms: 
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(3-19) 
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Note that removing the second and third order terms reduces the equation to the assumption that 
TAS = EAS.  Thus, the second and third order terms represent the effect of accounting for 
EAS→TAS conversion with altitude on the time to reach sea-level.  For example, when starting 
at an altitude of 1000 ft, the equation indicates that the EAS→TAS conversion is equivalent to 
reducing the distance traveled by 139 ft.  The third order term produces a distance of less than 1 
foot below h = 3738 ft.  It could be ignored for KSFO given that the geometric altitude of the trail 
aircraft is expected to be below 2200 ft when the lead aircraft is at the FAF.  But the term is kept 
for future use at other airports whose runways are at an elevation of 1500 ft MSL or greater. 
As indicated by the final formulation of Equation 3-19, this equation defines an equivalent 
airspeed distance term (DEAS) that is a function of geometric altitude.  We can substitute DEAS for 
the z/sin(	) terms in equations 3-1 through 3-9.  For example, the time to travel from SAP to TCH 
(Equation 3-2), becomes: 
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 (3-20) 
This substitution also works for the deceleration segment when deceleration is assumed to be a 
constant deceleration of the equivalent airspeed because the deceleration term can then be 
evaluated in the time integral: 
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Equation 3-23 is identical to the kinematic equation for constant acceleration for true airspeed 
with the distance term replaced with DEAS.  Finally, equations 3-1 through 3-9, modified to use 
DEAS, are applied to KSFO.  KSFO runways RWY28L and RWY28R are 13 ft above sea-level so 
the conversion of height above runway (z) to geometric altitude(h) is h = z + 13.  Furthermore, 
RWY28L has a TCH of 57 ft and RWY28R has a TCH of 55 ft.  The lead aircraft is placed on 
RWY 28L.  The final equations are: 
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(3-24)  
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To compute the X coordinate of the trail aircraft when the lead aircraft is at the FAF, first 
compute the position as a DEAS distance: 
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 (3-30) 
Then, solve the DEAS formula to determine the starting geometric altitude: 
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The last term, Dtrail sin	, represents an EAS equivalent altitude, h'.    Thus, the resulting solution 
will be a conversion from the EAS equivalent altitude (h') to the geometric altitude (h).  The real 
cube root of the cubic formula is a complicated formula.  To simplify it, the cube root is expanded 
into a Taylor series and the first four terms of the series are used:   
 ݄௧௥௔௜௟ ൌ ݄ᇱ ൅ ͹Ǥ͵ͳͷͶ͵ ൈ ͳͲି଺݄Ԣଶ ൅ ͺǤ͹ͺͺ͸ʹ ൈ ͳͲିଵଵ݄Ԣଷ ൅ ͳǤʹͷ͹ͳͺ ൈ ͳͲିଵହ݄Ԣସ (3-33) 
The X runway coordinate for the trail aircraft is then: 
 ܺ௧௥௔௜௟ ൌ െ  ߛ ሺ݄௧௥௔௜௟ െ ்݄஼ுሻ (3-34) 
Finally, the compression length (dcompression) is: 
 ݀௖௢௠௣௥௘௦௦௜௢௡ ൌ ଻ହ଴ ሺܺி஺ி െ ݀௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ െ ܺ௧௥௔௜௟ሻ (3-35) 
Using the prior example of the lead aircraft with a final approach speed of 120 KT and a trail 
aircraft with a final approach speed of 130 KT, the resulting value of dcompression and intermediate 
terms are: 
 tlead    = 147.4 seconds 
tI-trail   = 135.5 seconds, (tlead - tI-trail) = 11.9 seconds > tdelay so compute XD-trail 
tdecel   =   49.3 seconds 
Dtrail   =  36891 ft 
htrail   =    1959 ft 
Xtrail   = -36076 ft 
dcompression  =    2029 ft 
In comparison to the earlier example using the assumption that TAS = EAS, the compression 
length grew from 1957 ft to 2029 ft, a difference of 72 ft.  So, how can the compression length be 
larger when the time of flight for both aircraft is shorter?  The answer is that the trail aircraft 
maintains a higher altitude and, therefore, has a slightly higher true airspeed, even when the 
equivalent airspeed is equal to the lead aircraft.  Depending on the initial separation, this effect 
can cause added compression that is greater than the reduced compression from the shorter flight 
time.  It is a limitation of the EAS-based model.  In the procedure, the trail aircraft uses a speed 
management algorithm that maintains separation through deceleration, effectively causing the 
trail aircraft to track the true airspeed of the lead vehicle.  Therefore, until the trail vehicle 
decelerates to its final approach speed as an equivalent airspeed, the trail's equivalent airspeed 
should be slightly lower than the equivalent airspeed of the lead.  There is no simple mechanism 
to modify the EAS-based model for this behavior.  What is certain is that the compression length 
computed from such a modification would be between those computed by the EAS-based model 
and the TAS=EAS assumption.  The EAS-based model often provides the more conservative 
estimate.  Furthermore, the EAS-based model remains sufficiently simple to program or to use in 
generating look-up tables; therefore, it can be used in real-time by flight deck or controller 
systems to generate custom values of the front-gate separation for specific pairings.  
This kinematic model has other simplifications that can incrementally affect results.  First, the 
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model does not account for path deviation (lateral or longitudinal FTE) which can modify the 
flown distance (and therefore time) from FAF to touchdown.  However, the longitudinal window 
in which the separation between aircraft is allowed to float (see section 3.4.3) partly accounts for 
the path deviation.  The model also does not account for longitudinal deviation in the lead 
initiating the deceleration segment.  Late deceleration will shorten the compression distance; 
early deceleration will lengthen it.  The equations in this section can be adjusted to examine late 
or early deceleration, and this can be pursued if a future need arises for improved analysis.  
Lastly, the model is limited to the standard day profile for density in the 1976 atmosphere model, 
actual density that departs from the standard day profile will also adjust the compression distance.  
Again, investigating greater diversity in density profiles is left to future work if needed. 
3.3. Front Gate for the Constant Speed Segment 
When the lead aircraft reaches the final approach fix (FAF), the front gate is the minimum of 
1500 ft (see section 3.1) or the sum of the collision-free separation at the threshold (dcollision) and 
the compression distance (dcompression).  The previous section details the formulas used to derive 
dcompression but variation of the actual airspeed to the planned airspeed was not addressed.  In 
reality, the actual deviation of the airspeed from planned resembles a random walk plus a bias 
about the planned airspeed.  The equations for dcompression assume constant speed and cannot 
accommodate the random walk contribution to variation.  However, if one assumes the random 
walk is approximately symmetric about the bias, then its effect on front gate position is likely to 
be small enough to negligible.  This leaves the bias, which can be added to the planned aircraft 
speed.  Comprehensive studies of actual vs. commanded speed over the approach path could not 
be found.  However, Helleberg, et al. [Helleberg2006] performed an analysis of actual versus 
planned speed at the threshold.  Unfortunately, the quantitative values presented included both 
manual and autothrottle flights though the study also graphically depicts separate distributions for 
autothrottle and manual flights.  Moreover, the planned airspeed was derived from a Vref lookup 
table after estimating the aircraft landing weight.  This method is necessary to combine the 
manual and autothrottle flights.  However, for the paired-approach, the data of interest is 
deviation from commanded speed with autothrottle engaged.  In Helleberg's study, flights with 
autothrottle engaged could have commanded speeds that differ from the planned speed.  Still, for 
the most automated aircraft models, the Airbus A320 and Boeing 777, the mean deviation of 
actual speed from planned was +3.24 KT and +2 KT respectively with standard deviations of 3.6 
and 2.8 KT.  From these numbers, it appears reasonable to assume that the bias in the actual 
versus planned difference in airspeed (V) between the trail and lead aircraft is between 4 and 6 
KT.  Since the compression distance expands as the lead aircraft airspeed decreases and the trail 
aircraft airspeed increases, the bias is applied by decreasing the lead aircraft airspeed by half the 
bias and increasing the trail aircraft airspeed by half the bias.   
Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 show the front gate for lead aircraft approach speeds of 100 to 140 
knots equivalent airspeed (KEAS) with the trail aircraft V from 0 to 20 KEAS and with a V 
bias of 0, 4, and 6 KEAS.  The values are color-coded based on the length of the front gate: 
 1500 ft ≤ Green ≤ 2500 ft 
 2500 ft < Yellow ≤ 3500 ft 
 3500 ft < Red ≤ 4500 ft 
 4500 ft < Purple 
Table 3-2 presents this data for current generation aircraft and Table 3-3 presents this data for 
next generation aircraft.   
 
  
35 
Table 3-2: Front Gate for Current Generation Fleet 
Planned Vapp of 
Lead Aircraft  
Vapp 
Variation  
Planned Vapp of Trail Aircraft Final Approach Speed 
+0 
KEAS 
+5 
KEAS 
+10 
KEAS 
+15 
KEAS 
+20 
KEAS 
100 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 2315 3242 4204 5201 
+4 KEAS 2166 3104 4076 5083 6125 
+6 KEAS 2557 3518 4513 5542 6606 
110 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 2147 2995 3882 4808 
+4 KEAS 2011 2866 3759 4690 5659 
+6 KEAS 2367 3244 4159 5112 6102 
120 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1993 2779 3608 4481 
+4 KEAS 1868 2657 3488 4362 5278 
+6 KEAS 2195 3007 3860 4755 5692 
130 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1851 2588 3376 4214 
+4 KEAS 1735 2471 3256 4090 4972 
+6 KEAS 2039 2799 3607 4463 5366 
140 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1719 2422 3185 4009 
+4 KEAS 1610 2307 3061 3874 4745 
+6 KEAS 1895 2618 3398 4235 5128 
 
 
Table 3-3: Front Gate for Next Generation Fleet 
Planned Vapp of 
Lead Aircraft  
Vapp 
Variation  
Planned Vapp of Trail Aircraft Final Approach Speed 
+0 
KEAS 
+5 
KEAS 
+10 
KEAS 
+15 
KEAS 
+20 
KEAS 
100 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 2120 3060 4035 5045 
+4 KEAS 1963 2914 3899 4919 5973 
+6 KEAS 2357 3331 4339 5381 6457 
110 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1978 2839 3739 4678 
+4 KEAS 1834 2703 3608 4552 5534 
+6 KEAS 2192 3083 4011 4976 5979 
120 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1850 2649 3491 4377 
+4 KEAS 1717 2519 3363 4250 5178 
+6 KEAS 2047 2871 3738 4646 5595 
130 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1734 2484 3285 4135 
+4 KEAS 1610 2360 3157 4004 4899 
+6 KEAS 1916 2690 3511 4379 5296 
140 KEAS 
0 KEAS 1500 1628 2344 3120 3956 
+4 KEAS 1511 2221 2989 3814 4699 
+6 KEAS 1799 2535 3328 4177 5084 
 
The CONOPS currently identifies a minimum approach speed (Vapp) of 120 KT and a target 
capability to accommodate V of up to 20 KT [MITRE2013].  However, both values are 
identified as to-be-resolved (TBR).  The tables show that for parallel, paired approach using 
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echelon spacing, a planned V of 20 KT requires a front gate larger than 4500 ft (0.74 NM) for 
all speeds if actual V can vary.  Therefore, a planned V of 20 KT appears infeasible for the 
paired approach.  For lead aircraft with Vapp ≥ 120 KT, a planned V ≤ 15 KT can be 
accommodated with a front gate of 4500 ft if the bias in actual V can be held below 6 KT.  This 
front gate can also accommodate slower Vapp if planned V ≤ 10 KT.  A front gate of 3500 ft can 
accommodate Vapp ≥ 120 KT and planned V ≤ 10 KT if the bias in actual V can be held below 
4 KT, which may be feasible for next generation aircraft.  A front gate of 3500 ft can also handle 
all Vapp and the maximum V bias if planned V ≤ 5 KT.  Overall, a front gate of 2500 feet 
covers 31% of the table cells, a front gate a 3500 ft covers 55% of the cells, and a front gate of 
4500 feet covers 77% of the cells.  This study will explore the feasibility of the procedure with 
front gates of both 3500 ft, which might be achievable for planned V ≤ 10 KT with future 
avionics, and 4500 ft, which expands the pairable V to 15 KT. 
3.4. The Wake-Safe Distance 
3.4.1. Modeling Wake Transport 
This study uses the wake transport model described in section A.3 of the CONOPS 
[MITRE2013].  The model performs a constant velocity transport of the wake from its generation 
point to the wake encounter zone of the trailing vehicle.  The transport velocity is the sum of the 
crosswind velocity and, when below 400 ft AGL, a wake self-transport velocity of 2 knots.  
Figure 3-4 depicts the geometry that defines the distance the wake travels laterally before 
encountering the trailing vehicle.2  The wake encounter zone is defined as a lateral distance from 
                                                     
 
2 Note that Figure 3-4 shows the geometry using the instantaneous true location of each aircraft.  Applying 
the model to a given runway separation with aircraft that perform to a given total system error is discussed 
later.   
Figure 3-4: Wake Transport Model 
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the centerline of the trailing vehicle.  This distance is defined as a safe encounter distance of 100 
feet plus the radius of the wake vortex. 3  The distance for the wake to travel is the lateral distance 
between its generation point and the wake encounter zone.  
The following equation expresses the distance to a wake encounter: 
 ୣ୬ୡ୭୳୬୲ୣ୰ ൌ Ȃୱୟ୤ୣȂ୴୭୰୲ୣ୶Ȃ୴୭୰୲ୣ୶ (3-36) 
where, 
 Y is the true lateral distance between aircraft, in feet. 
 Dsafe  is the safe encounter distance from the trail aircraft’s centerline, it equals 100 ft. 
 Rvortex  is the radius of the vortex which equals (Dvortex/2). 
 Dvortex  is the generation location of the vortex from the lead aircraft’s centerline.  It is equal to 
( Dwingspan/8) where Dwingspan is the wingspan of the lead aircraft. 
This study will assume that the lead aircraft is a Boeing 747-400. 4  The Boeing 747-400 has a 
wingspan of 211 ft 5 in.  The distance equation, therefore, reduces to:  
 ܦ௘௡௖௢௨௡௧௘௥ ൌ ܻȂ ʹʹͶǤͷ݂ݐ (3-37) 
The next part of the problem is determining the worst-case (i.e. minimum) Y for the closely-
spaced parallel runway (CSPR) procedure.  This is discussed in the next section. 
Dencounter is then converted to a time-to-encounter (Tencounter)  by dividing Dencounter by the wake 
transport velocity (Vtransport).   Vtransport is the sum of the maximum allowable crosswind (Vcrosswind) 
and, if under 400 ft AGL, the self-transport velocity (Vself-transport): 
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
Ͳ  ൒ ͶͲͲ

 (3-38) 
The CONOPS uses a “worst-case” Vself-transport of 2 knots [MITRE2013]; however, since this study 
is looking at the wake-safe distance at the FAF, Vself-transport will be zero.  For Vcrosswind, this study 
uses a worse-case value of 10 knots. 
Lastly, the longitudinal wake-free boundary is the product of the time-to-encounter (Tencounter) 
and the trail aircraft’s true speed (Vtrail).   
 
ܮ௪௔௞௘ି௙௥௘௘ ൌ  ௘ܶ௡௖௢௨௡௧௘௥ כ  ௧ܸ௥௔௜௟ ൌ ܦ௘௡௖௢௨௡௧௘௥ כ 
௧ܸ௥௔௜௟
௧ܸ௥௔௡௦௣௢௥௧
 (3-39) 
3.4.2. Closest Lateral Separation under Normal Operations 
The closest allowable lateral separation under normal operations (Y) determines the 
                                                     
 
3 The safe encounter distance is not the distance that avoids the wake but the distance where a wake 
encounter does not endanger the aircraft.    This distance is used to maintain consistency with the analysis 
presented in the CONOPS [MITRE2013].  However, in future studies, replacing the safe encounter distance 
with the half-wingspan of the largest trail aircraft is recommended.  This changes the runway separation 
calculated by the difference between the half-wingspan and 100 ft. 
4 The Boeing 747-400 was chosen to maintain consistency with the CONOPS [MITRE2013].  Prior NASA 
studies have used the wider Boeing 747-8.   
  
38 
design-to, wake-free boundary for the procedure.  The lateral separation between aircraft during 
the procedure is determined by the actual path each aircraft flies.  The deviation of the actual path 
from the desired path is characterized by the total system error (TSE).  TSE is made of three error 
components: path definition error (PDE), navigation error (NE), and flight technical error (FTE).  
PDE is the difference between the path defined by the on-board avionics and the desired path; it 
is normally negligible and can be ignored.  NE is the error between the position of the aircraft 
estimated by the on-board navigation system and its actual position.  FTE is the error in the 
autopilot or crew's ability to fly the path.  NE and FTE are both modeled by a normal distribution; 
therefore, TSE is also modeled as a normal distribution.  The TSE, NE, and FTE values presented 
here are 95% confidence bounds (1.96). 
To date, comprehensive studies of FTE for aircraft on approach have examined a mixture of 
hand-flown and autopilot approaches using the Instrument Landing System (ILS) as the primary 
navigation aid.  Thomas and Timoteo [Thomas1990] and Thomas, Timoteo, and Huang 
[Thomas1993] showed that the FTE of ILS approaches increases with distance from threshold.  
FTE exceeded 200 ft at distances greater than 8 to 10 NM from the threshold and, on final 
approach, FTE was less than 40 ft/NM from threshold.  Eckstein [Eckstein2011] also depicted the 
localizer deviation of ILS approaches starting at 7 NM from threshold and computed the FTE at a 
point 3 NM from the threshold.  Unlike previous work, Eckstein divided the data between hand-
flown and autopilot approaches.  The FTE of hand-flown approaches was an order of magnitude 
greater than autopilot approaches.  The FTE of the autopilot approaches was less than 10 feet.   
Eckstein's study keeps open the possibility that it may be possible for the paired approach 
procedure to be performed from start to finish using only the ILS with the autopilot engaged.  
However, until a comprehensive analysis of autopilot only approaches with ILS have been 
conducted, this study will proceed under the assumption that the aircraft pair performs an RNP or 
GPS RNAV approach to the FAF (though each aircraft may transition to the ILS navaid 
afterwards).  This study uses two sources of TSE or FTE data for RNAV or RNP approach to 
represent current generation and next generation aircraft.  Murphy presented data from Air France 
showing that the TSE of aircraft on RNP approach was 59 m (194 ft) at the time they disengaged 
the autopilot [Murphy2010].   Passerini provides data on the Quantas fleet of Boeing 737-800s 
that measure the FTE of RNP approaches at 0.02 NM (37 m or 122 ft) [Passerini2011].  The TSE 
value of 59 m will be used to represent RNP or RNAV performance in the current generation 
aircraft.  The FTE value of 37 m will be used to represent next generation aircraft. 
This study assumes that a GPS-based navigation system or equivalent will be used to estimate 
the position of the aircraft.  Current generation aircraft are assumed to have an autonomous GPS 
system.  RTCA DO-242A Appendix J.3.3 characterizes the lateral NE of autonomous GPS as 
12.5 m; however, in an unpublished work used for development of the CONOPS, Eftekari 
[Eftekari 2008] identifies the lateral NE of autonomous GPS as 8 m (26 ft) based on observations 
from ADS-B flight tests at the FAA Technical Center in July 2007.  This study will use the 
smaller 8 m NE.  Next generation aircraft are assumed to have a Wide-Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS) GPS system or better.  RTCA DO-242A Appendix J.3.3 characterizes WAAS 
GPS with a lateral NE of 3.5 m (12 ft) [RTCA2002].     
Table 3-4: Total System Error of Aircraft Fleets 
 TSE FTE NE Event Duration Events/Procedure 
Current Generation 59.0 m 58.5 m 8.0 m 70 s 6 
Next Generation 37.2 m 37.0 m 3.5 m 70 s 6 
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The final TSE, FTE, and NE values are summarized in Table 3-4.  Recognize that these errors 
are defined for a sample.  To ascertain their affect on the maximum deviation over the entire 
approach path during normal operations, it is necessary to determine how many samples will 
occur during the course of the procedure.  Aircraft do not suddenly jump from one error to the 
next, the error occurs as a random walk with a period in distance or time.  Boeing identifies the 
period between independent FTE events at 70 seconds [Boeing2012].  For GPS receivers, the 
period between independent navigation error events is four to eight minutes.  However, because 
NE is much smaller than FTE, the period of NE events is made equal to FTE events for 
simplicity.  Thus, the period of independent events for TSE, FTE, and NE are each set at 70 
seconds for both current and next-generation aircraft.  The paired-approach procedure can have a 
duration of up to six minutes at KSFO based on approach path geometry and speed schedule.  
Therefore, six independent events can occur during the course of the procedure.   
Having established the lateral error characteristics of the aircraft, these characteristics are 
applied to a definition of normal operation in order to determine the bounds on lateral deviation.  
Normal operation is defined by the alert rate and alert integrity for the participating aircraft.  
Independent monitoring of the lead aircraft by the trail is not practical because ADS-B 
uncertainties are large relative to the lateral path separation (see section 3.4.3).  Therefore, each 
aircraft is responsible for monitoring its own lateral deviation.  Aircraft are capable of monitoring 
their lateral FTE directly.  The alert rate is assumed to be 10-4 alerts per aircraft per procedure 
without a blunder.  Because lateral FTE is being monitored but lateral NE cannot be monitored.  
The aircraft can exceed its alerting bounds without an alert.  Therefore, the containment bound 
for normal operation is also defined by an alert integrity criterion equivalent to RNP integrity 
requirements of 99.999% containment per hour.   
First, the alerting bounds are computed.  Part of the per-aircraft, per-procedure alert rate 
(araircraft) is allocated to alerted hardware failure (aravionics) and part of this rate is allocated to 
aircraft performance (arFTE).  It is assumed that the hardware will have an alerted failure at a rate 
of 5 x 10-5/hr.  This alerted failure rate is taken from the continuity requirement for RNP of 
99.99% per hour and assumes that half the probability of continuity failure is due to alerted 
hardware failure.  It is also assumed that the hardware alert rate is linear with time and reduces to 
aravionics = 5 x 10-6/procedure.  The remaining alert rate due to aircraft performance is 9.5 x 10-5 
per procedure.  The equivalent alert rate per FTE sample (arFTE) is given by Equation 3-41 where 
nFTE is the number of FTE samples per procedure.  This equation is derived from the probability 
of no alert (1 - araircraft ) being equal to the combined probability of no hardware failure (1 - 
aravionics ) and the probability that the aircraft will not exceed the alerting bound (1 - arFTE) for each 
of the six FTE samples (Equation 3-40).  The resulting per FTE sample alert rate is 1.6 x 10-5.    
 ൫ͳ െ ܽݎ௔௜௥௖௥௔௙௧൯ ൌ ሺͳ െ ܽݎ௔௩௜௢௡௜௖௦ሻሺͳ െ ܽݎி்ாሻ௡ಷ೅ಶ (3-40) 
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 (3-41) 
Using arFTE, the FTE bound that triggers an alert is determined from the normal distribution.  
Though deviations to only one side of the aircraft adversely affect the lateral separation between 
aircraft, the FTE bound will be computed for alerting on either side of the aircraft path.  This is 
simpler from a procedural perspective.  There is no need to identify the aircraft as being on the 
left or right runway and the alerting remains similar to loss of containment alerts for RNP.  The 
following equation computes the alerting bound (yalert) where erf-1 is the inverse error function: 
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Next, the alert integrity bound is computed.  This bound is designed to be equivalent to the 
RNP requirement of 99.999% containment per hour per aircraft, i.e. upaircraft = 10-5 / hr.  The study 
assumes that integrity loss is divided equally between un-alerted hardware failure (upavionics) and 
position uncertainty (upTSE).  Therefore, both contributions have a probability of 5 x 10-6 / hr.  
This probability is further reduced to a probability of upavionics = upTSE = 9.7 x 10-8 per FTE 
sample.  The resulting probability of un-alerted containment loss during the procedure 
(accounting for both aircraft) is 1.75 x 10-6.    
The quantity upTSE represents the probability that the true position of aircraft (ytrue) is beyond 
the integrity bound (yintegrity) when the aircraft does not generate an alert.  This occurs when the 
navigation error is of a sufficient adverse value to place the estimated position of the aircraft 
(yFTE) below the alerting bound yalert.  Because of the symmetry in the normal distribution of 
lateral deviation, upTSE can be formulated as twice the probability, on one side of the path, that 
ytrue will be outside yintegrity when |yFTE| < yalert.  Thus, one constructs the combined probability that 
the navigation error (yNE) is greater than yintegrity - yFTE for all yFTE in the range [-yalert, yalert].  This 
is represented by the dual integral below:  
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where FTE and NE are the standard deviation of the FTE and NE errors, respectively.  
Recognizing that the inner integral is equivalent to an integral with the range [-λ, yFTE - yintegrity], 
the double integral reduces to: 
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where erf() is the error function.  This outer integral cannot be further reduced and must be 
resolved numerically.  Therefore, the yintegrity value that corresponds with a upTSE value is solved 
iteratively using root-finding methods. 
The design-to lateral separation bounds for each aircraft are the larger of yalert and yintegrity.   
Table 3-5 summarizes the probabilities used to define normal operation in this section.  Table 3-6 
shows the values of FTE, NE, yalert and yintegrity, rounded up to the nearest foot, for current and 
next generation aircraft and how these values affect required path separation.  The required path 
separation is computed from Equation 3-37 where Y = 2 x max(yalert, yintegrity), i.e. the worst case 
is when both aircraft deviate toward each other by the design-to separation bounds. The path 
separation values shown here merely depict the spacing at which the wake vortex does not need 
to move to encounter the trail aircraft if both aircraft are positioned at their integrity bounds.  A 
feasible runway spacing must be much greater than the value shown.  These results show that 
neither current nor next generation aircraft can accommodate 750 ft runway spacing with a 
parallel echelon procedure.  The question is how much spacing is needed to enable the procedure.  
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To answer this question it is necessary to determine the length of the echelon window based on 
expected longitudinal deviation during normal operation.    
Table 3-5: Summary of Probabilities Defining Normal Lateral Deviation 
Total Alert Rate (araircraft) 10-4 / aircraft / procedure 
 Hardware Alert Rate (aravionics) 5 x 10-6 / procedure 
 Position Alert Rate (arFTE) 
9.5 x 10-5 / procedure 
1.583 x 10-5 / FTE sample 
Total Un-alerted Lateral Containment Loss (upprocedure) 2.3 x 10-6 / procedure 
 Loss due to un-alerted hardware failure (upavionics)  
5.8 x 10-7 / procedure 
9.7 x 10-8 / FTE sample 
 Un-alerted loss due to position uncertainty (upTSE) 
5.8 x 10-7 / procedure 
9.7 x 10-8 / FTE sample 
Number of FTE samples per procedure (nFTE) 6 
Duration of FTE sample 70 seconds 
 
Table 3-6: Lateral Deviation Parameters under Normal Operation 
 Current Generation Next Generation 
FTE 98 ft 62 ft 
NE 13.4 ft 5.9 ft 
yalert 408 ft 258 ft 
yintegrity 438 ft 271 ft 
path separation >> 1100 ft >> 767 ft 
 
3.4.3. Minimum Longitudinal Window under Normal Operations 
The minimum longitudinal window during normal operations is defined similarly to the 
expected lateral deviation during normal operations in the previous section.  Normal operation is 
defined by a desired alert rate and an alert integrity criterion similar to lateral operation.  Here, 
the trail aircraft monitors its position relative to the lead aircraft and attempts to maintain a 
desired separation.  As with lateral monitoring, the desired alert rate is to be no greater than 10-4 
per procedure.  Alert integrity due to position uncertainty will also be maintained to the same 
requirement as RNP integrity. 
One difference in the longitudinal monitoring is that the longitudinal separation is subject to 
both ADS-B OUT errors of lead aircraft and the longitudinal TSE of both aircraft.  Longitudinal 
TSE and its component FTE and NE are assumed equal to the lateral TSE, FTE, and NE.  The 
same similarity holds for the duration of a longitudinal TSE event (70 seconds) and the number of 
longitudinal TSE events in a procedure (6).  ADS-B OUT data is assumed to be derived from the 
lead aircraft's navigation solution.  Therefore, the variation in ADS-B reported position has three 
components, navigation error (NE), latency compensation error, and uncompensated latency 
error.  The latter two are combined into an ADS-B latency error (ALE).  The combination of all 
three components is the estimated position uncertainty (EPU) of the ADS-B output.  ADS-B EPU 
is normally reported as a 2-D radius uncertainty and is assumed to conform to a Rayleigh 
distribution.  Therefore, the standard deviation of uncertainty in longitudinal position (EPU) is 
EPU/2.447.  Current Generation aircraft are assumed to have an EPU of 92.6 m, which conforms 
to the FAA ADS-B rule [FAA2010].  Next Generation aircraft are assumed to have an EPU of 10 
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m associated with a Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) value of 10.  These 
errors are used to determine the variation in observed separation to the planned separation.  The 
observed separation is the difference in the observed position of the lead aircraft (via ADS-B 
OUT) and the observed position of the trail aircraft (via its navigation system).  The ADS-B OUT 
report represents the lead aircraft's observation of its own longitudinal FTE plus the ALE.  The 
trail aircraft uses observation of its own position to monitor its longitudinal flight technical error 
(FTE).  Therefore, the variation in observed longitudinal separation is a combination of both 
aircraft's FTE and the ALE of the lead aircraft: 
 
ߪ௢௕௦ ൌ ටሺߪி்ாሻ௟௘௔ௗଶ ൅ ሺߪி்ாሻ௧௥௔௜௟ଶ ൅ ሺߪ஺௅ாሻ௟௘௔ௗଶ  (3-45) 
The standard deviation of ALE is computed by subtracting the contribution of NE to EPU: 
 
ߪ஺௅ா ൌ ටߪா௉௎ଶ െ ߪோଶ  (3-46) 
The longitudinal alert uses similar probability assumptions to the lateral alert.  The 
longitudinal alert rate is 10-4 per procedure with alerted hardware failures occurring with a 
probability of 5 x 10-6 / procedure.  Therefore, alerts due to separation performance (arsep) are 9.5 
x 10-5 / procedure or 1.583 x 10-5 / FTE sample.  There are two contributors to variation in 
separation performance.  The first is the variation in observed separation.  The second is the 
response time (tdelay) of the trail aircraft to the lead aircraft.  During that time, the airspeed 
difference between the two aircraft can vary.  For this study, the longitudinal airspeed difference 
is assumed to vary with a standard deviation (
V) of 3.4 KT (5.7 ft/s or 1.7 m/s); this number is 
derived from an assumed 3 KT standard deviation in the horizontal airspeed of each aircraft.  The 
equivalent spacial variation (
x) is the product of tdelay and V.  For current generation aircraft, 

x is 29 ft and, for next generation aircraft, x is 20 ft.  Therefore the total variation in 
separation performance (sep) is: 
 
ߪ௦௘௣ ൌ ටߪ௢௕௦ଶ ൅ ߪο௫ଶ  (3-47) 
The longitudinal alerting bound (xalert) is therefore: 
 ݔ௔௟௘௥௧ ൌ ߪ௦௘௣ξʹ݁ݎ݂ିଵ൫ʹܽݎ௦௘௣ െ ͳ൯ (3-48) 
The integrity of the longitudinal alert also uses similar probability assumptions to the lateral 
alert.  Un-alerted longitudinal containment loss is 10-5 / hr with the contributions of un-alerted 
hardware failure (upavionics) and position uncertainty (upTSE) both at 9.7 x 10-8 per FTE sample.  
Derivation of the integrity bound (xintegrity) is the same as for the lateral integrity bound with the 
following differences.  The two PDFs involved are the PDF of separation performance (and thus a 
function of sep) and the PDF of navigation uncertainty.  However, the navigation uncertainty in 
this case is the combined navigation uncertainty of the two aircraft.  Since the navigation 
uncertainty of the two aircraft is assumed equal, the PDF of the combined navigation uncertainty 
is a function of 2 NE.  The resulting equation for xintegrity is: 
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The design-to longitudinal window for the trail aircraft (xwindow) is double the larger of yalert 
and yintegrity.  Table 3-7 summarizes the probabilities used to define normal operation in this 
section.  Table 3-8 shows the values of sep, NE, xalert, xintegrity, and xwindow, rounded up to the 
nearest foot, for current and next generation aircraft.    
Table 3-7: Summary of Probabilities Defining Normal Longitudinal Deviation 
Total Alert Rate (araircraft) 10-4 / procedure 
 Hardware Alert Rate (aravionics) 5 x 10-6 / procedure 
 Position Alert Rate (arFTE) 
9.5 x 10-5 / procedure 
1.583 x 10-5 / FTE sample 
Total Un-alerted Lateral Containment Loss (upprocedure) 1.17 x 10-6 / procedure 
 Loss due to un-alerted hardware failure (upavionics)  
5.8 x 10-7 / procedure 
9.7 x 10-8 / FTE sample 
 Un-alerted loss due to position uncertainty (upTSE) 
5.8 x 10-7 / procedure 
9.7 x 10-8 / FTE sample 
Number of FTE samples per procedure (nFTE) 6 
Duration of FTE sample 70 seconds 
 
Table 3-8: Longitudinal Deviation Parameters under Normal Operation 
 Current Generation Next Generation 
sep 194 ft 97 ft 
NE 13.4 ft 5.9 ft 
xalert 806 ft 403 ft 
xintegrity 842 ft 418 ft 
xwindow 1684 ft 836 ft 
3.4.4. Calculating the Wake-Safe Distance 
The required wake-safe distance (Lwake-free) is a simple summation of the longitudinal window 
(xwindow) and the front-gate (xfront-gate): 
 ܮ௪௔௞௘ି௙௥௘௘ ൌ ݔ௙௥௢௡௧ି௚௔௧௘ ൅ ݔ௪௜௡ௗ௢௪ (3-50) 
3.5. Determining Feasible Runway Separation and Conclusions 
The feasible runway separation can be computed as a function of the required wake-safe 
distance (Lwake-free) and the lateral integrity (yintegrity).  First, the required wake transport distance 
(Dencounter) is computed by inverting Equation 3-39: 
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Before the FAF, the worst-case wake transport velocity (Vtransport) is equal to the maximum 
adverse crosswind of 10 KT.  The trail aircraft velocity (Vtrail) is nominally 180 KT but we will 
assume that variation in speed performance can decrease it to a minimum of 177 KT. 
With Dencounter computed, the minimum runway separation (Yrunway) that is feasible for the 
procedure is: 
 ο ௥ܻ௨௡௪௔௬ ൌ ʹʹͶǤͷ݂ݐ ൅ܦ௘௡௖௢௨௡௧௘௥ ൅ ʹݕ௜௡௧௘௚௥௜௧௬ (3-52) 
Table 3-9 shows the results, rounded up to the nearest foot, for current and next generation 
aircraft: 
Table 3-9: Feasible Separation Geometry 
 Current Generation Next Generation 
xfront-gate 3500 ft 4500 ft 3500 ft 4500 ft 
Lwake-free 5184 ft 6184 ft 4336 ft 5336 ft 
Dencounter 293 ft 350 ft 245 ft 302 ft 
Yrunway 1393 ft 1450 ft 1010 ft 1066 ft 
 
As the results show, current generation aircraft cannot conduct paired approaches on parallel 
paths using echelon spacing on runways less than ~1400 ft apart and next-generation aircraft 
cannot conduct the paired approach on runways less than ~1050 ft apart.  In both cases, the 
minimum spacing increases by about 50 feet if the front gate must be 4500 ft at the FAF.  These 
runway separations are the same as in the initial estimates for which passing becomes safe using 
the SAPA procedure (see Section 2.1.3.1).  Therefore, for parallel approaches, the paired-
approach with echelon spacing does not offer an increase in airports where the procedure is 
feasible.  Furthermore, since the SAPA approach allows passing, SAPA can more easily 
accommodate larger differences in approach speed and lower minimum approach speeds.   
However, the echelon spacing approach should maintain a cost advantage for new or modified 
equipage since it requires only monitoring of lateral and longitudinal bounds while SAPA 
requires an alerting algorithm and an automated escape maneuver.  Nevertheless, the above 
analysis used a simple wake transport model and the feasible runway separation for echelon 
spacing may grow if higher-fidelity models further constrict the wake-free distance.  Such a case 
would further tilt in favor of SAPA over echelon spacing. 
What aircraft performance would be necessary to enable operation at runways separated by 
750 ft?  Runway separation has the most sensitivity to the FTE of the participating aircraft.  The 
FTE of the next generation aircraft was reduced until the runway separation fell at or below 750 
feet for both front gates of 3500 and 4500 ft.  Table 3-10 shows the results: 
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Table 3-10: Performance Required to Enable Paired-Approach for 750ft Runway Spacing 
xfront-gate 3500 ft 4500 ft 
FTE (95%) 63 ft (19.2 m) 50 ft (15.3 m) 
yalert 134 ft 107 ft 
yintegrity 148 ft 122 ft 
xalert 255 ft 228 ft 
xintegrity 271 ft 245 ft 
Lwake-free 4042 ft 4989 ft 
Dencounter 229 ft 282 ft 
Yrunway 749 ft 749 ft 
 
As the table shows, aircraft FTE must decrease by half in next generation aircraft to open the 
paired approach procedure for 750 foot runway spacing.  The feasibility of achieving such 
performance on a straight approach from loss of vertical separation to the threshold is 
questionable.  However, aircraft performing CAT IIIB ILS approaches routinely achieve this 
level of performance within the inner marker where the ILS navigation error is similar to the 
assumed WAAS GPS navigation error of 3.5 m lateral.  Nevertheless, many aspects of flight 
within the inner marker (including airspeed and winds) are more favorable to controlling path 
deviation than flight beyond the FAF (outer marker).  More data on actual straight-in approaches 
using state-of-the-art autopilot and autothrottle systems will be needed to better characterize the 
total system error that can be routinely achieved. 
One final note, the alerting rates in this analysis are cumulative.  With each aircraft having a 
10-4 rate of lateral alerts and the trail aircraft having a 10-4 rate of longitudinal separation alerts, 
the total breakout rate for the procedure is approximately 3 in 10,000 procedures.  Any further 
decrease in this total will require wider runway spacing or improved aircraft path performance. 
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4. Towards Lower Visibility Minima 
The MITRE echelon procedure [MITRE2013] takes advantage of an offset leg that merges 
about 1 NM from the runway threshold.  This is necessary so that the final 1 NM parallel landing 
can be achieved using VFR rules.  In this section we consider the potential of an IFR landing if 
the ALAS algorithm were used.  In our earlier work, we found that the aircraft could not be 
allowed to pass each other for a runway spacing of 750 ft. But there are two reasons why the 
ALAS alerting algorithm may enable lower visibility minima when used in conjunction with the 
MITRE echelon concept: 
1. The total system error (TSE) is significantly smaller for the last 1 NM of the 
approach and therefore the ALAS alerting algorithm will be more effective here. 
 
2. The MITRE procedure constrains the aircraft to be longitudinally separated at the 
FAF which will provide some longitudinal separation at the merge point even after 
much ground speed compression. 
 
The tAlas simulation was configured to simulate the parallel landing after the merge point: 
 
 
 
 
Different simulations were run varying the parameter ClosestInitSepAllowed over range from 
0 ft to 250 ft and varying the parameter maximumGsDifferential over range from 0 KT to 30 KT.  
Because these simualtion runs begin after the turn, they are equally valid for echelon spacing 
on parallel approaches. 
4.1. Experimental Results Using Monte Carlo Simulation Starting 1 NM From Runway 
The tAlas simulation was run in Monte Carlo mode varying runway separations, initial 
separation longitudinally, and the maximum ground speed difference.  In all cases the intruder 
and ownship were given starting positions in the range of 1 NM to 1.5 NM.      
We begin with a baseline result obtained by running the tAlas simulation with alerting and the 
escape maneuver disabled.  In this simulation, the ownship was always in the rear position.  The 
results are given in Table 4-1.  Note that acceptable probabilities are indicated in blue font and 
unacceptable probabilities are indicated in red. 
ClosestInitSepAllowed 
1 NM 
 
Figure 4-1: Parallel landing after the merge point 
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Table 4-1: Results for 750 ft Runway Spacing, No Escape Maneuver 
 
Initial Longitudinal 
Separation (at 1 NM) 
Max GS 
Difference 
Probability 
250 ft 5 2.34E-02  4.78E-05 
250 ft 10 3.65E-02  5.93E-05 
250 ft 15 4.49E-02  6.55E-05 
250 ft 20 5.00E-02  6.89E-05 
   
500 ft 5 1.63E-03  1.27E-05 
500 ft 10 1.18E-02  3.42E-05 
500 ft 15 2.33E-02  4.77E-05 
500 ft 20 3.15E-02  5.53E-05 
   
750 ft 5 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
750 ft 10 7.40E-04  8.60E-06 
750 ft 15 7.01E-03  2.64E-05 
750 ft 20 1.52E-02  3.87E-05 
   
1250 ft 5 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
1250 ft 10 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
1250 ft 15 8.38E-07  2.49E-07 
1250 ft 20 5.87E-04  7.66E-06 
   
1500 ft 5 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
1500 ft 10 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
1500 ft 15 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 
1500 ft 20 3.34E-06  5.58E-07 
 
 
The largest ground speed differential for each initial longitudinal separation is given in Table 
4-2. 
Table 4-2: Summary of  Results for 750 ft Runway Spacing, No Escape Maneuver 
 
Initial Longitudinal 
Separation (at 1 NM) 
Largest GS 
Difference that 
meets Target 
Probability 
250 ft --- 
750 ft 5 
1250 ft 15 
1500 ft 20 
 
Clearly, without an alerting algorithm and an escape maneuver, there must be an initial 
longitudinal separation of at least 1500 ft at the merge point to accommodate ground speed 
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differences up to 20 KT.  This is achieved procedurally in the MITRE concept of operations by 
constraining the aircraft to be 4000+ ft apart longitudinally at the FAF and disallowing pairings 
with large ground speed differences.   
We next explored the potential of deploying the ALAS alerting algorithm on the final leg of 
the approach that begins 1 NM from the runway threshold.  In these runs we have constrained the 
samples so that the ownship was always in the rear position.  We note that the ALAS runway 
conformance algorithm could be used during the offset approach, but the full collision algorithm 
would likely generate a large number of false alarms while one aircraft was on the offset leg. 
In Table 4-3 we show the impact of the ALAS algorithm when used on this final leg. 
Table 4-3: Summary of  Results for 750 ft Runway Spacing (Final Parallel Leg) 
Initial Longitudinal 
Separation 
Max GS 
Difference 
Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
0 ft 5 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 287.91 
0 ft 10 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 237.37 
0 ft 15 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 264.17 
0 ft 20 6.38E-07  2.05E-07 291.13 
    
250 ft 5 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 287.91 
250 ft 10 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 264.17 
250 ft 15 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 246.49 
250 ft 20 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 291.13 
 
 
The ALAS alerting system is especially effective here because the total system error is smaller 
nearer the runway. 
The results are very promising but they critically depend upon having both a turn and vertical 
acceleration in the escape maneuver.  Also, the analysis assumes that the turn of the ownship 
from the offset path to the centerline doesn't increase the TSE in the final 1 NM.  In the next 
section we explore the impact of disabling the turn component of the escape maneuver. 
4.2. A Closer Look at the SAPA Escape Maneuver When Near to the Ground 
In this section we will provide a limited look at the problem of executing the escape maneuver 
when the aircraft is very near to the ground.  Because of near ground obstacles, we could imagine 
that below a certain altitude, the aggressive turn component of the escape maneuver must be 
turned off, and only the vertical climb will be allowed to occur.  We ran the tAlas simulation for a 
1050 ft runway separation for the SAPA procedure.  We turned off the turn component at 
different altitudes and measured the collision probability. 
In Table 4-4 we present the probability of a collision as a function of the cutoff altitude where 
the turn component of the escape maneuver is disengaged. 
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Table 4-4: Simulation Runs for 1050 ft Runway using Escape Maneuver with No Turn 
Cutoff 
Altitude (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Probability (400 ft) Probability (large 
cylinder) 
Minimum 
Distance (ft) 
0 1.5 9.84E-06  9.81E-07 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 316.55 
50 1.5 1.99E-05  1.40E-06 1.44E-06  3.49E-07 163.95 
100 1.5 2.00E-04  4.47E-06 1.27E-05  1.12E-06 128.78 
200 1.5 1.64E-03  1.28E-05 9.71E-05  3.11E-06 123.07 
300 1.5 3.72E-03  1.92E-05 2.15E-04  4.64E-06 119.49 
 
The results are drastically different than those obtained with the turn component included.  
The reason for this difference is seen in the following failure case.  Here, the blunder occurs near 
the ground (below 300 ft) and the turn component of the escape maneuver was disabled and 
therefore the horizontal view shows the ownship continuing to follow the centerline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The vertical view shows that the intruder levels out and by the time the alert occurs and the 
climb maneuver engages, the ownship is well below the intruder.  The ownship then climbs back 
through the path of the intruder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this trial, the blunder started at time 117 (marked by circle) and the red alert occurred 3.0 
seconds later.  The point of closest approach is colored in orange which occurred at time 131.5.  
The ownship aircraft performed a vertical climb, but no turn because the blundering aircraft was 
Motion 
Motion 
Figure 4-2: Escape maneuver near the ground (Top View) 
Figure 4-3: Escape maneuver near the ground (Side View) 
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currently located at 275 ft AGL.  In this case the blunder was a level-out blunder and was slightly 
above the ownship.  By the time the ownship maneuvers, it descends below the level out altitude 
of the intruder and then climbs back up into a loss of separation: (H: 232.95 ft, V: 86.75 ft).  If the 
turn were enabled, a loss of separation would not have occurred here. 
4.3. A First Look at an Intelligent Escape Maneuver 
The escape maneuver examined in the previous subsection is clearly inadequate.  However, an 
escape maneuver that is different depending on the available ownship and traffic state vectors 
may be able to remedy the problem.  There are many avenues to pursue, but the following two 
approaches may be a part of the solution: 
1. Use the throttle to increase ground speed rather than altitude for a short time. 
2. Delay the vertical climb until sufficient horizontal separation has been achieved. 
This strategy is only used when the intruder is longitudinally close to the ownship and the 
intruder is above the ownship in altitude.  We have performed some very preliminary simulations 
where a ground speed acceleration of 4 m/s2 used in conjunction with a delayed vertical ascent.  
This alternate maneuver was only used when the intruder was longitudinally within 350 ft and at 
least 20 ft above the ownship in altitude.  The ground speed acceleration continues until 250 KT 
was reached.  The vertical climb was delayed about 8 seconds. 
The table shows that if the turn was not disengaged until 100 ft AGL, then this strategy has a 
good potential of working.  In future work, we will look for ways to improve the intelligent 
escape maneuver further and perhaps raise the altitude further where the turn component can be 
turned off. 
Table 4-5: Simulation Runs for 1050 ft Runway using Intelligent Maneuver with No Turn 
Cutoff 
Altitude (ft) 
ADS-B 
Latency (s) 
Probability (400 ft) Probability (large 
cylinder) 
Minimum 
Distance (ft) 
0 1.5 9.84E-06  9.81E-07 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 316.55 
50 1.5 1.02E-05  1.00E-06 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 200.30 
100 1.5 4.50E-05  2.12E-06 2.44E-06  4.71E-07 150.96 
150 1.5 2.63E-04  5.13E-06 1.38E-05  1.17E-06 150.96 
200 1.5 7.20E-04  8.48E-06 3.76E-05  1.93E-06 140.87 
300 1.5 1.86E-03  1.36E-05 9.65E-05  3.10E-06 134.27 
 
4.4. Modifying the Offset Paired-Approach to Enable Lower Decision Minima 
The offset paired approach in the CONOPS is currently defined at KSFO with a minimum 
descent altitude (MDA) of 363 MSL (350 AGL) and a decision height (DH) of 200 ft (CAT I).  
This work looked at the modifications to the offset paired approach that would enable CAT II or 
CAT III A/B approach minima.  The instrument landing system (ILS) remains the only 
operational technology in the near term to enable CAT II or CAT III A/B approaches.  Therefore, 
this study examined the path stability of the trail aircraft at heights of 200 ft, 100 ft, and 50 ft 
AGL after the aircraft turned onto the extended runway centerline to capture the localizer.  The 
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intercept point of the offset path with the extended centerline was varied and set at heights along 
the glidepath of 370 ft, 587 ft, 730 ft, and 833 ft.  The first intercept height is 1 NM from the 
threshold and allows the fastest aircraft to turn onto the centerline above the 200 ft DH.  The 
heights in between approximately correspond to turns completed by the slowest aircraft at 
distances of 1 NM and 1.5 NM from the 200 ft DH. The 833 ft height is the highest intercept 
height that allows the fastest aircraft to initiate the turn onto centerline after the stabilized 
approach point (SAP).    
The high-fidelity transport-class aircraft simulation in Langley's Cockpit Motion Facility 
(CMF) was used to assess the FTE of aircraft at each of the decision heights.  To perform a 
Monte-Carlo analysis with the high-fidelity simulation, it was necessary to configure the flight 
automation differently from the expected procedure design but try to maintain similar lateral 
deviation errors.   In the modified offset paired-approach procedure, the trail aircraft is expected 
to fly the offset path as an RNP or RNAV(GPS) leg as described in the CONOPS.  This offset 
path is automated by the flight management computer (FMC).  The FMC then executes the turn 
from the offset leg onto the centerline.  When the turn nears completion, the localizer and 
approach modes will be armed either manually by the crew or automatically by the FMC (which 
may require equipage modifications).  The crew will then manage the flight in accordance with 
procedures for CAT I, CAT II, CAT IIIA, or CAT IIIB approach as normal.  The CMF simulation 
utilizes a hardware FMC; therefore, it is not practical to include the FMC in a Monte-Carlo 
execution of the simulation.  Instead, the offset path was automated using a localizer type 
directional aide (LDA) under localizer mode (LOC) for lateral flight with vertical-speed mode 
(VERT SPD) used to automate flight along the glidepath.  The turn was automated using heading 
select mode (HDG SEL).  Near completion of the turn, the simulation changed the ILS frequency 
to the runway ILS and armed both localizer and approach mode using delays as if these modes 
were manually armed by the crew.  To stimulate flight technical errors in the aircraft, navigation 
errors were enabled for both the LDA and runway localizer.  However, to ensure that data was 
collected at the same distance from the runway threshold, errors were not enabled for vertical 
flight.  For similar reasons and to isolate the effects of navigation error as the primary cause of 
lateral deviation, winds, atmospheric disturbances, and errors in sensed airspeed were not 
enabled.  The signal-in-space error for the runway localizer was set to the navigation error limits 
of a CAT III ILS for all runs.  For the LDA, two signal-in-space errors were used.  The navigation 
error limits of a CAT III ILS were used to examine path stability when the navigation error is the 
same on both the offset path and extended centerline.  The navigation error limits of a CAT I ILS 
were used to examine path stability when the navigation error is larger on the offset path than the 
extended centerline.  The numerical parameters for the CAT III and CAT I localizer errors were 
derived from data in table 13.3 of Kayton and Fried [Kayton1997].   
For each combination of intercept height and localizer navigation error, 6000 runs were 
performed.  These runs included six final approach speeds of 122 KN, 130 KT, 138 KT, 145 KT, 
153 KT, and 160 KT, each of which are associated with a 10 ton increase in aircraft landing 
weight.  These speed selections were combined with 1000 random seeds for the localizer 
navigation error.  The simulation was configured for landings at KSFO RWY28R using the 
published runway and runway ILS geometry.  Geometry of the LDA was derived by rotating the 
RWY28R ILS about the intercept point by the offset angle of 3.  Flights began at an altitude of 
2600 ft and a commanded speed of 180 KT.  Flights decelerated to their final approach speed 
starting at the FAF (1800 AGL).  Characteristics of the simulation are summarized in Table 4-6. 
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Table 4-6 Simulation Parameters for Modified Offset Approach 
Final Approach Speeds 122 KT, 130 KT, 138 KT, 145 KT, 153 KT, 
160 KT 
Landing weights5  80T, 90T, 100T, 110T, 120T, 130T 
Intercept height of offset path with centerline 
(AGL) 
370 ft, 587 ft, 730 ft, 833 ft 
LDA offset 3 
CAT III Localizer Navigation Error (95%) 0.0525 
CAT I Localizer Navigation Error (95%) 0.1642 
Initial Altitude (AGL) 2600 ft 
Initial Speed (EAS) 180 KT 
Glidepath angle 3 
FAF height (AGL) 1800 ft  
Number of runs per trial 6000 
 
The simulation results are show in Table 4-7.  To interpret the results, the maximum safe TSE 
at the 50 ft decision height (CAT IIIB) is ±27 ft, taken from table 13.2 of Kayton and Fried 
[Kayton1997].  The maximum safe TSE for the 100 ft and 200 ft DH is set at ±35 ft and ±50 ft, 
respectively, to accommodate expected increase in TSE with distance from threshold for an ILS 
approach.  In all cases, TSE at the 200 ft DH improved as the intercept point moved further away 
from the runway threshold.  TSE at 100 ft DH and 50 ft DH reach their minimums at the intercept 
height of 730 ft.  For the CAT I LDA to CAT III ILS, which best resembles modification of the 
paired-approach described in the CONOPS, the aircraft cannot achieve sufficient stability on the 
localizer path for landing at any decision height when the intercept height is 370 ft.  A couple of 
the behaviors observed in the simulation work against achievement of path stability this late in 
the approach.  First, the autopilot of the simulated aircraft takes eight seconds to engage LOC 
mode from the time LOC is armed.  Second, once the LOC mode is engaged, the aircraft appears 
to fly two under-damped oscillations about the path before smoothly aligning with the localizer 
beam.  With the fastest aircraft, these behaviors require a distance of more than 0.5 NM to 
complete; therefore, the faster aircraft does not complete capturing of the localizer path until after 
the 200 ft DH for an intercept height of 370 ft.  However, at the next intercept height of 587 ft, 
TSE does show sufficient stability across all three decision heights to conduct a landing.  
Moreover, the improvement is large enough that it may be possible achieve acceptable results at 
an intercept height between 370 and 587 ft.  However, a number of secondary effects that might 
increase TSE or decrease its rate of decay were not enabled in the simulation.  Moreover, the TSE 
observed on the offset path in the simulation was half as large for the CAT I LDA as the 40 m 
TSE assumption for the offset path in the CONOPS [MITRE2013].  Therefore, a more 
conservative recommendation is to compare the two scenarios of CAT III LDA to CAT III ILS 
and CAT I LDA to CAT III ILS, and chose the intercept height where sensitivity to TSE on the 
offset path disappears.  This occurs beginning in the neighborhood of the 730 ft intercept height. 
 
 
                                                     
 
5 Landing weights have a one-to-one correspondence with the approach speeds. 
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Table 4-7 Observed TSE at Decision Heights for Modified Offset Paired-Approach 
Intercept Height 
(ft AGL) 
Total System Error (ft, 95% bounds) 
CAT III LDA to CAT III ILS CAT I LDA to CAT III ILS 
200 ft 100 ft 50 ft 200 ft 100 ft 50 ft 
370 25 19 18 77 47 37 
587 21 18 17 25 20 18 
730 20 17 16 21 17 16 
833 19 17 16 19 17 16 
 
These results indicate that it is not possible to conduct landing at CAT II or lower minima for 
offset path intercept at or below 1 NM from the threshold.  Therefore, the geometry for the offset 
paired-approach currently defined in the CONOPS cannot be extended to lower minima.  The 
intercept point must be increased to 1.5 and 2 NM from the threshold.  Extending the intercept 
distance, however, also constricts the wake-safe distance throughout the procedure.  This 
constriction presents the biggest challenge on the parallel portion of the approach.  For a given 
procedure availability, the necessary crosswind tolerance increases with altitude, reaching a near 
asymptote around 10 KT adverse crosswind [Audenaerd2012].  The offset portion of the 
approach provides relief from the increasing crosswind by increasing the distance that the wake 
must travel.  However, the parallel portion of the approach must absorb the entire effect of 
increasing crosswind.  The CONOPS design was validated, assuming the current fleet of aircraft 
in service, with a maximum near surface crosswind of 5 KT.  Similar studies would need to be 
performed to ascertain the feasibility of extending the parallel portion of the approach with the 
current aircraft fleet or to determine the future performance necessary to execute this modified 
approach.  The study, however, does suggest that, when the TSE on the offset path and turn 
equals that of a CAT III approach (CAT III LDA to CAT III ILS), then a late turn onto the 
extended centerline at 1 NM becomes possible.  However, achieving similar performance on the 
offset path, would require next generation avionics utilizing high accuracy navigation sources like 
ground-based augmentation system approach service type D (GAST-D) GPS or even wide-area 
augmentation system (WAAS) GPS with 5 Hz update rate.  
4.5. Observations 
The ALAS alerting algorithm is especially effective when the aircraft are within 1 NM of the 
runway threshold.  This is due to the significantly smaller TSE in this region.  Therefore, from a 
collision detection viewpoint, the potential of lowering the visibility minima using a hybrid 
procedure is very promising.  However, the high-fidelity simulation indicates that stabilizing the 
approach path on a CAT III ILS is possible for the current generation aircraft fleet only for 
intercept points at least 1.5 to 2 NM from the threshold.  Assessing the aircraft capabilities 
necessary to conduct the offset paired-approach with the offset intercept at higher elevations will 
require additional simulation studies.  Alternatively, the high-fidelity simulation results also 
suggest it may be possible to retain a 1 NM intercept distance if technology can be developed to 
constraint total system error to the accuracy of a straight-in CAT III ILS approach when flying 
the latter part of the offset path, the turn onto the extended centerline, and the extended centerline 
to touchdown.  Such a system may be possible using GAST-D GPS or even WAAS GPS with 5 
Hz update rate.       
We have briefly looked at the issue of executing the escape maneuver while near to the 
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ground.  It is conceivable that near ground blunders are extremely unlikely and perhaps they can 
be excluded.  But if these blunders cannot be excluded, future work will be necessary to develop 
a more intelligent escape maneuver that differs depending on the relative position and velocity of 
the aircraft. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this report we present the analytical and experimental results using the ALAS alerting 
algorithm in several variants of a future paired approach concept of operations.  We examined the 
SAPA procedure for different runway spacings using a fast-time simulation and found that the 
SAPA procedure can be used at 950 ft separations or higher with next-generation avionics and 
that 1150 ft separations or higher is feasible with current-rule compliance ADS-B OUT.  Both of 
these results depend upon the use an aggressive escape maneuver that is automatically 
engaged.  The runway separations can be lowered an additional 50 ft if different glideslopes are 
used (i.e. 2.85° and 3.0).  We have also conducted high-fidelity simulations at 1050 ft for next-
generation avionics and 1400 ft separation for the current-rule ADS-B, which confirmed the fast-
time simulations.  The Joint Planning Development Office (JPDO) recently asked NASA to 
consider whether adding additional aircraft states, like roll angle, to ADS-B OUT could improve 
results; NASA has added expansion of ADS-B state data to its planned FY14 work.   
We have also analyzed the use of echelon spacing for straight in approaches without the use of 
the ALAS alerting algorithm.  The statistical analysis shows that current generation aircraft 
cannot conduct paired approaches on parallel paths using echelon spacing on runways less than 
1400 ft apart and next-generation aircraft will not be able to conduct paired approach on runways 
less than 1050 ft apart.  These runway separations are greater than the estimates for which passing 
becomes safe using the SAPA procedure (see Section 2.1.3.1).  Since the SAPA approach allows 
passing, SAPA can more easily accommodate larger differences in approach speed and lower 
minimum approach speeds.  However, the echelon spacing approach has a cost advantage since it 
requires only monitoring of lateral and longitudinal bounds while SAPA requires an alerting 
algorithm and an automated escape maneuver.    
Finally, we looked at the use of the ALAS alerting algorithm in conjunction with the MITRE 
echelon concept.  The goal of this work was to lower the visibility minima requirements for the 
MITRE CONOPS.  The fast-time simulation found that the ALAS alerting algorithm was very 
effective when deployed starting at 1 NM from the threshold.  However, for the offset paired-
approach, the high-fidelity simulation showed that stabilizing the approach path on a CAT III ILS 
was only possible for current generation aircraft at merge points at least 1.5 to 2 NM from the 
threshold.  Nevertheless, the high-fidelity simulation results suggest that it may be possible to 
retain a 1 NM intercept distance if technology can be developed to constraint total system error 
on the offset path and final turn.  Such a system may be possible using ground-based 
augmentation system approach service type D (GAST-D) GPS or even wide-area augmentation 
system (WAAS) GPS with 5 Hz update rate.  Without such technology, this hybrid approach 
using an offset path is not likely to be feasible at a 1 NM merge point.  We have also identified an 
issue in using the escape maneuver near ground (e.g. 300 ft or below).  Due to airport buildings 
and surrounding terrain, the turn component may have to be disengaged until a sufficient height is 
reached.  Preliminary results show that this can have a serious impact on the probability of a 
collision.  Nevertheless, the same ground obstacles can also restrict the blunder characteristics of 
the lead aircraft.  More analysis is required to determine the limits of both blunder and escape 
maneuvers near the ground. 
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6. Future Work 
In FY14, NASA plans to pursue improvements in paired-approach procedure design and the 
ALAS alerting algorithm to increase the availability of the paired-approach procedures while 
improving safety.  
 Evaluate the benefits of adding roll-angle to the ADS-B OUT broadcast.  Roll angle often 
leads the observed turn performance of the intruder aircraft.  Therefore, it is possible that the 
broadcast of roll angle can provide earlier alerts and reduce the required runway separation 
for safe passing under the SAPA procedure.   
 Evaluate the benefits of adding Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) slant 
range data as an input to the ALAS alerting algorithm.  TCAS slant range has higher accuracy 
than slant range derived from ADS-B OUT broadcasts.  It may be possible to develop alerting 
criteria derived from or blended with TCAS slant range data to improve alerting performance. 
 Refine and enhance the performance of the ALAS alerting algorithm, based on actual aircraft 
position/velocity data for auto-coupled, auto-throttle approaches obtained from FAA data 
sources. 
 Continue hybrid Paired Approach (CAT II/III) development with echelon spacing and ALAS 
alerting to achieve enhanced performance to lower weather minima.  For echelon spacing 
with an offset path, assess the capabilities needed to move the merge point an additional 0.5 
to 1.0 NM from the runway. 
 Investigate the problem of executing an escape maneuver near the ground (e.g. 350 ft and 
below).  Develop an intelligent escape maneuver that is based on the available positions and 
velocities of the aircraft. 
 Integrate interval management for closely spaced parallel operations (IM-CSPO) and SAPA 
using flight-deck interval management (FIM) to deliver aircraft to the initiation point for 
SAPA and then transition to a SAPA operation.  
The results in this paper and those of future work are subject to the fidelity and uncertainty of 
wake vortex models.  Higher fidelity models of wake vortices and better characterization of 
model uncertainties will be necessary to increase confidence in the safety of estimated wake-free 
boundaries.  Moreover, improved wake-vortex modeling may also reveal opportunities to 
accommodate closer runway spacing through adjustments in the procedure.  For parallel approach 
procedures like SAPA, the need for improved wake-vortex characterization extends across all 
three regions of vortex behavior: in-ground effect (IGE), near-ground effect (NGE), and out-of-
ground effect (OGE). 
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Appendix A.   New Offset Runway Conformance Algorithm 
 
The previous version of the ALAS Alerting algorithm was designed for fully parallel approaches 
only.   However, the latest version of the algorithm and software enables runway conformance 
testing on merged approaches.   The algorithm is illustrated in the Figure A-1: 
 
 
 
  
The runway centerlines are solid lines.  The dotted red lines show the maximum deviation 
before an alert is issued.  The runway centerlines are extended with dashed lines.  The algorithm 
measures the perpendicular distance from both runway centerlines.  The safe side distance is 
given a negative sign and hence becomes a negative number.  The maximum distance is used as 
the runway deviation.  This maximum distance is compared to two positive parameters values: 
yellowRunwayDist and redRunwayDist.  If the distance exceeds these values an alert is issued. 
If the position vectors are Euclidean the calculation is straight-forward: 
      t = (q – s)v / vv  
     Distance = || s + t v – q ||  
If the position vectors are given in geodesic coordinates: 
Compute the “cross track distance” as defined by the Aviation Formulary (v1.44) by Ed 
Williams.  This function forms a great circle from two points on the centerline (p1, p2).  It 
then computes the shortest distance of another point (off Circle) to the great circle: 
cross_track_distance(p1, p2, offCircle) { 
dist_p1oc = angular_distance(p1,offCircle); 
trk_p1oc = initial_course_impl(p1,offCircle,dist_p1oc); 
trk_p1p2 = initial_course(p1,p2); 
//This is a direct application of the "spherical law of sines" 
return distance_from_angle(asin(sin(dist_p1oc)*sin(trk_p1oc-trk_p1p2)), 
            (p1.alt()+p2.alt()+offCircle.alt())/3.0);   
Figure A-1: Offset runway conformance bounds 
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Thus far we have not performed any simulations using this new ALAS capability.  The 
algorithm has been coded in both Java and C++ and is ready for experimental use in future work. 
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Appendix B.   tAlas Simulation Validation 
B.1.   Results for Cylinder Protection Zone and No Escape Maneuver 
In this section we present the results of a baseline run, executing the tAlas simulation with no 
alerting and no escape maneuver.  This is important to insure that the simulation is generating 
blunders that will lead to collisions if not detected. 
Table B-1: Results for Various Runway Spacings with No Escape Maneuver  
Runway 
Spacing (ft) 
Num Los Probability Minimum Distance (ft) 
750 1,863,967 1.86E-01  1.23E-04 0.86 
850 1,682,885 1.68E-01  1.18E-04 0.48 
950 1,521,025 1.52E-01  1.14E-04 0.87 
1050 1,375,997 1.38E-01  1.09E-04 0.26 
1150 1,245,431 1.25E-01  1.04E-04 1.13 
1250 1,129,458 1.13E-01  1.00E-04 0.41 
1350 1,025,597 1.03E-01  9.59E-05 0.25 
1450 932,246 9.32E-02  9.19E-05 0.86 
 
Comparing this table with Table 2-5 shows us that the ALAS alerting algorithm provides at 
least 4 orders of magnitude improvement.    
B.2.   Impact of maxT2 on Blunder Angle of Incidence 
The T2 parameter controls the duration of the blunder turn.  This value will determine the 
maximum angle of incidence of the intrusion onto the ownship’s centerline. 
 
Table B-2: Angle of Incidence of Blunders For Runway 1050 ft, 1.5 s latency as a function of 
MaxT2 
MaxT2 Maximum 
Incidence Angle () 
Average 
Incidence Angle () 
10 30.94 7.90 
11 33.58 8.54 
12 36.17 9.17 
13 41.50 9.86 
14 46.97 10.63 
15 52.47 11.47 
16 56.60 12.37 
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Table B-3: Angle of Incidence of Blunders For Runway 750 ft, 1.5 s latency as a function of 
MaxT2 
MaxT2 Maximum 
Incidence Angle () 
Average 
Incidence Angle () 
10 30.78 8.11 
11 33.40 8.73 
12 35.99 9.35 
13 41.32 10.02 
14 46.14 10.78 
15 50.12 11.59 
16 51.63 12.42 
 
For a given runway spacing there is a maximum angle of incidence onto the ownship’s 
centerline that can be achieved.  For a 1050 ft runway the maximum angle of incidence is a bit 
over 30 degrees.  Increasing maxT2 increases the frequency of more aggressive maneuvers and 
hence increases the probability of a LoS.   
B.3.   Track Rate Threshold Sensitivity 
The performance of the Alas alerting algorithm is strongly dependent upon the 
trackRateThreshold parameter.  The collision detection component of the algorithm is engaged 
when the intruder’s averaged turn rate exceeds the value of this parameter.  If it is set too low, 
there will be too many false alarms.  If it is set too high, then the alert will be delayed longer.  In 
Table B-4 the impact of this parameter is shown for the 950 ft runway spacing case and in Table 
B-5 the impact on the 1050 ft runway spacing case is shown.  Note that acceptable probabilities 
are indicated in blue font and unacceptable probabilities are indicated in red. 
Table B-4: Simulation Runs for 950 ft Runway using Different Track Rate Thresholds 
Track Rate 
Threshold 
(/s) 
Probability (400 ft) Probability (large 
cylinder) 
Minimum 
Distance (ft) 
1.0 1.40E-04  3.74E-06 3.34E-06  5.58E-07 258.65 
1.1 2.11E-04  4.59E-06 7.84E-06  8.73E-07 218.96 
1.2 3.13E-04  5.59E-06 1.58E-05  1.25E-06 212.68 
1.5 8.50E-04  9.21E-06 7.69E-05  2.77E-06 157.66 
2.0 2.96E-03  1.72E-05 4.37E-04  6.61E-06 58.79 
 
Using the large cylinder protection zone, values of this parameter of 1.2 or larger resulted in 
collision probabilities that are beyond our target value of 1E-05/landing.  There were some CMF 
runs where false alarms were seen, but the latest version of ALAS used for generating the fast-
time results in this paper does not exhibit false alarms for these runs. The trackRateThreshold 
parameter was set at 1.0 /s for these runs. 
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Table B-5: Simulation Runs for 1050 ft Runway using Different Track Rate Thresholds 
Track Rate 
Threshold 
(/s) 
Probability (400 ft) Probability (large 
cylinder) 
Minimum 
Distance (ft) 
1.0 9.84E-06  9.81E-07 4.38E-07  1.48E-07 316.55 
1.1 1.77E-05  1.32E-06 5.38E-07  1.79E-07 292.52 
1.2 3.18E-05  1.78E-06 7.38E-07  2.28E-07 292.15 
1.5 1.34E-04  3.67E-06 6.24E-06  7.76E-07 240.72 
2.0 7.11E-04  8.43E-06 7.96E-05  2.82E-06 141.78 
 
Note that if the trackRateThreshold parameter were increased to 1.5 /s, then the 950 runway 
spacing would no longer be available, but the 1050 runway spacing would still be practical.  We 
do not expect that the parameter will need to be this large because in the CMF simulation results 
we very rarely see any track rates above 0.5 /s.  We hope to test the behavior of the ALAS 
algorithm on real landing data to tune this parameter to its optimal value.  Also, there is potential 
to improve the averaging filter that is used in the algorithm if real landing data becomes available. 
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Appendix C.   Measuring ALAS False Alarm Rate Using 
MITRE/Boeing TSE Model 
Our fast-time simulation tAlas was used to measure the false alarm rate of ALAS.  For this 
experiment, the ownship’s protection zone was defined as a moving quadrant D distance away 
from the ownship’s centerline in the direction of the intruder and X units behind the ownship, as 
illustrated in Figure C-1.  The protection zone extends forward from the ownship all the way to 
the runway to account for the possibility of a catastrophic wake encounter if the intruder were to 
cross in front of the ownship.  Crossing behind the ownship is considered safe (for the ownship).  
The area to the side of the ownship away from the intruder is included in the protection zone as 
this is where the ownship would escape in case of a red alert.  A blunder was defined as any 
intruder trajectory that entered the ownship’s protection zone.  A false alarm occurs when ALAS 
issues a red alert on an intruder trajectory that does not carry it into the ownship’s protection 
zone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-1: Top view of the scenario for measuring the false alarm rate 
To measure the false alarm rate, we ran landing trials in which the aircraft followed their 
respective glide paths at constant ground speeds.  These trials used a random lateral error model 
tuned for a typical distribution of deviations from the centerline for both the ownship and the 
intruder.  This model is described in the next section.  There were no blundering trajectories 
during these tests.  The aircraft were given initial positions on their glide paths between 7 and 8 
NM from the runways with a longitudinal separation between 1000 and 1500 ft.  The ground 
speeds ranged between 114 and 160 KT with a maximum speed difference of 15 KT.  The 
protection zone parameters were set to X = 400 ft and D = 230 ft.  The landing trials ran for 400 
seconds of simulated time or until the altitude of one or both aircraft dropped below 100 ft above 
ground level.  We ran four sets of landings, each with 7,290,000 landing trials.  Only the 
TrackRate Threshold of ALAS changed between the sets of landings.  All other parameters of 
ALAS and the test trajectories remained constant.  Two statistics were collected for each set of 
trials: the number of red alerts issued by ALAS and the number of false alarms.  As there were no 
blunders in any of these landing trials, the false alarm rate was equal to the number of red alerts 
divided by the number of trials. 
C.1.   Lateral Error Model 
The simulation of the lateral motion of the aircraft used a flight technical error (FTE) model 
from MITRE [Eftekari2008], which was based on a lateral control model for final precision 
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approach developed by Boeing [Warren1999].  This parameterized model can be tuned to the 
characteristics of any aircraft and simulates effects of path disturbances due to closed loop 
guidance errors, wind and gusts.  The model consists of a pair of differential equations for the 
aircraft lateral deviation y and track angle  relative to the centerline.   
݀οݕȀ݀ݐ ൌ  כ ߰  
݀߰Ȁ݀ݐ ൌ െ݇ଵ כ ߰ െ ݇ଶ כ ȟݕ ൅ ߝ  
The variables y and  are illustrated in Figure C-1 for the intruder aircraft.  y is in units of feet 
per second and  has units of radians.  Variable v denotes the aircraft airspeed in units of feet per 
second.  Parameters k1 and k2 are control gains.  The input  is a noise error process representing 
centerline deviations of the track angle.   
This model describes a second order closed-loop system with disturbance .  The control gains 
are related to the damping constant  and natural frequency  as follows. 
݇ଵ ൌ ʹߦ߱  
݇ଶ ൌ ߱ଶȀ  
The natural frequency  in units of radians is related to the frequency f in Hz and the period p 
in seconds. 
߱ ൌ ʹߨ ൌ ʹߨȀ  
For the simulations to measure the false alarm rate of ALAS, the damping constant  had a 
range from 0.3 to 0.5 and the period p had a range from 55 to 65 seconds.    
The input  represents disturbances acting on the aircraft and causing deviations of the track 
angle, which then cause lateral deviations from the centerline.  The error model is parameterized 
with the standard deviation of the lateral error y.  This is derived from the FTE bound defined as 
the 95% containment lateral error. 
y = FTE/1.96 
The FTE can be inferred from the least accurate RNP level for aircraft under consideration for 
the simulation.  These aircraft are assumed to be equipped with GPS flight management systems. 
FTE = (minimum RNP)/1.38 
So: 
y = (minimum RNP)/2.705 
The disturbance  is modeled with a Johnson distribution given as a reshaped Normal 
distribution with slight higher probabilities at the extreme ends of the value range.  
 = zj* 
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zj = e(z/2.18) – e(-z/2.18) 
z = x/

  
x = N(0, 

), a Gaussian random process with 0 mean and 

 standard deviation 


 = (2*k1*k2*y2/v)1/2 
For the false alarms runs the FTE was set to 60 ft. 
C.2.   Results and Analysis 
Table C-2 shows the measured false alarm rates as a function of the TrackRate Threshold.  As 
would be expected, the false alarm rate decreases as the alarm threshold is relaxed.  The false 
alarm rate was significant for a threshold of 1.0, which is the current value set through a tuning 
process for the ALAS parameters.   
Table C-2: False alarm rate results 
ALAS TrackRate Threshold False Alarm Rate 
0.7 47.36% 
1.0 24.72% 
1.5 2.20% 
2.0 0.14% 
 
It is known that the performance of ALAS is sensitive to the value of the TrackRate Threshold 
parameter as this is used to trigger the sweep algorithm that predicts blunder trajectories.  Any 
intruder trajectory with a track rate exceeding the set threshold and a predicted potential intrusion 
into the front or back buffer of the ownship triggers a red alert.  ALAS has a low pass filter 
intended to reduce the sensitivity to track rate noise, but the attenuation must be balanced with the 
amount of signal lag (i.e., timing delay) introduced by the filter.  This lag delays the triggering of 
red alerts and impacts the performance of the ownship’s escape maneuver. 
 A quick examination of the lateral error model reveals that the track rate is a direct function 
of the noisy disturbance .  Thus, although the model may be representative of actual patterns of 
lateral error deviation, it is our judgment that the track rate is not representative.  We know that 
the trajectories generated by the CMF high-fidelity simulations do not contain as much track rate 
noise.  Based on this, we decided not to use this lateral error model to measure the performance of 
ALAS or tune its parameters.  We will continue to use in tAlas the simple sinusoidal oscillation 
model for the lateral error until a more representative stochastic model is available. 
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